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Executive summary 
Within the telecommunications industry most standards are decided in the SSO‟s where 
representatives from actors from the different parts of the value chain are represented. The discussions 
in these forums in the different SSO‟s are limited to being of a technological content and not business 
in order to simplify the discussions and decisions made about the new standards. The 
telecommunications industry is defined by the standards and the IP-holders of the innovations 
included in the standards are subjected to license according to FRAND rules as long as they are 
members of the SSO‟s. Patents that either belong to actors outside the SSO‟s or patents of members 
within the SSO‟s that are not part of the standard are subjected to licenses that are negotiated 
individually between the different actors. 
 
This current standardization system is characterized by conflict and a lack of clarity, due to a lack of 
administrative clarity and of consensus regarding the interpretation of policies such as FRAND 
licensing. Members of the SSO‟s are believed to take advantage of this fact by demanding high 
royalties from the licensees. Current complaints include the perception that licensing costs are unduly 
burdening the costs required to produce mobile terminals based on standardized innovation. The 
inability to monitor the royalties opposed by the different IP-holders has resulted in the total price for 
licensing all essential patents within a standard for a licensee to become too high and in no way 
FRAND. 
  
The conflicts in the system have motivated actors to present changes to the current structures of the 
system, and these will most likely impact the compensation possibilities for actors involved in 
standardization. In this thesis the focus is placed on analyzing four such potential changes and their 
impact on compensation possibilities. These four scenarios concern Patent Pools, Royalty Caps, Ex 
Ante Declaration and New Standards Bodies. These scenarios and the material used to analyze and 
determine the effects of scenarios like those being implemented are a product of interviews with 
mainly a major Swedish IP-holder within the telecommunication industry, law and market studies and 
last but not least the actual ongoing discussions about changes within the SSO‟s made by the different 
actors/members of the SSO‟s.  
 
As will be seen in this thesis all these new proposals although they will indisputably solve some of the 
problems with the current standardization system, they will also present difficulties in terms of 
implementation and the creation of consensus. A key conclusion of the thesis is that such changes can 
lead to a number of different outcomes based on their implementation, and recommendations are 
therefore made for the strategically aware actor wishing to initiate such changes in a beneficial manner.  
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1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the general issues that underlie the purpose and 
scope of this thesis. The chapter brings up the approach taken by the authors to the thesis, the 
background to which the thesis applies, and some of the methodological considerations taken into 
account when designing the scope of the thesis as such. 
 
Standardization within the telecommunication sector has been the dominant market strategy since the 
deregulation of the state telecom monopolies. The current system has been rid of the strict regulations 
of state control, but the technology and market specific requirements of the telecommunications field 
have given rise to a compromise system, in which free market actors voluntarily submit to regulation 
and coordination intended to create standardized development and diffusion of technological value. As 
the structures established to bring about this regulation are primarily initiatives controlled and 
originated by market actors, the struggle between the interests of these actors is represented by a lack 
of clarity and established homogeneity in the collection of structures and mechanisms termed the 
“standardization system” within this thesis. Policies such as FRAND licensing and an unwillingness 
on the part of the administrative organs of this system, the standards setting organizations (SSO‟s) has 
created a system that gives the appearance of order but contains both confusion, conflict, and potential 
for the strategically aware actor to bring about influences suiting its market and development strategies.  
 
The lack of clarity in the system has lead to great potential for change in compensation possibilities, 
which is the driving mechanism of maintaining the system in the first place. Combining the various 
interests of the actors in the standardization system who, as will be demonstrated, span several levels 
of the traditional value chain, leads to a number of often vaguely worded compromises. Without 
support structures outside of the market to clarify and enforce these compromises, actors often end up 
committing to a joint policy but interpret it in radically different ways. In terms of compensation, this 
leads to disparate understandings of the central tenets of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, and 
opens up possibilities for conflicts regarding the perceived burdens of costs related, primarily, to 
intellectual property.   
 
The thesis also looks at how actors within the SSO‟s adapt to the lack of clarity in the aforementioned 
structures, and create the foundation for joint technological innovation on a basis of veiled competition 
and market conflict. This climate of competition and collaboration creates complexity, and actors 
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wanting to maximize their value exploitation have clear incentives to manipulate the system as far as 
possible, considering the lack of clearly defined and enforced sanctions. In others words there is a 
strong conflict of interest and power struggle, where the actors/members are challenged by the need to 
be able to predict and react to changes to obtain a leading position within the industry. The thesis takes 
as its starting point this semi-chaotic structure, and suggests means by which the strategically aware 
actor can influence the structures of the system to maximize their own control over and gain from the 
system. 
1.2 Background 
Telecommunication refers to communication over long distances and covers all kind of 
communication forms through radio, telegraphy, television, telephony, data communication and 
computer networking. Telecommunications on the other hand refer to the underlying technology or as 
according to ITU (2000), “Any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images 
and sound or intelligence of any definition applies to at least two different kinds of communicating at 
a distance, traditional telecommunications and broadcasting.
1” 
 
The elements of a telecommunication system are a transmitter, a medium and a channel imposed on 
the medium, and a receiver. The transmitter is the device that will transform or encode the message 
into a physical phenomenon; the signal. The transmission medium will then modify or degrade the 
signal that is transmitted from the transmitter to the receiver. The receiver with its decoding 
mechanism will recover the message and the end-user will thereby have access to the information sent
2
. 
In other words a basic communications system consists of end user equipment, network access 
connections, network interconnection devices and a control system that coordinates the network
3 
and 
thus a lot of actors fulfilling all those functions. 
 
In figure 01 the basic telecommunications system is presented. There can be different types of end 
user equipment used to allow customers to access network and thus one or more communication 
systems. The access network links the customer to a communication network through copper wire, 
coax or fiber
4
. Different communication networks can be interconnected to each other and connect end 
users to other end users or information services.  
 
                                                     
1 ITU 2000 
2 Lindmark, 2002 
3 Harte et al, 2002 
4 Lindmark, 2002 
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Figure 01: Basic Telecommunication System
5
 
 
The telecommunications industry has a long tradition in standardization since it is the founder of 
standardization. As one can understand from the short description of a telecommunication system 
there are many actors involved in different ways contributing to services, hardware and software that 
will enable communication between two physical entities. In order to make sure that new innovations 
would be diffused and used in a wide scale to avoid practical problems that could occur by 
implementing different systems, the standardization and thus the SSO‟s became forums to regulate and 
monitor the actors within this industry. The majority of the future technologies like 3G, MPEG, etc are 
discussed and adopted in these forums. One could say that opposed to courts and regulations the 
telecommunication industry and the players on it look at the SSO‟s for guidance.  
 
As expected some players driven by the monetary and power aspect that want to maximize their own 
wealth by increasing income and decreasing their costs, work towards altering the regulations within 
these forums to achieve that. One of the primary motivations for the study undertaken in the thesis is a 
recent proposal by a coalition of mobile telephony operators, spearheaded by Vodafone, which 
attempts to address a perceived imbalance in compensation between actors in the standardization 
system. Vodafone, and its partners, assert that the major owners of intellectual property within the 
system are allowing costs related to those properties to unduly burden the remainder of the system, 
through, for example, licensing costs, and that this is inflating the costs to the end-user of actually 
purchasing the mobile handsets incorporating standardized technologies. In a challenge to the major 
European telecommunications standards setting organization ETSI (the European Telecommunications 
Standardization Institute) in November 2005, the Vodafone-led group demanded a complete overhaul 
of the current licensing structures permitted under ETSI policies, and this proposal, and some of its 
suggested changes, forms the basis for analysis of tools and conflicts within the standardization system 
as a whole. 
                                                     
5 Lindmark, 2002 
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1.3 The objective 
Given the current situation of the debates within SSO‟s for eventual changes in the system, this thesis 
will concentrate on (1) describing the System that all actors are involved within the telecommunication 
industry, (2) defining the role of the key actors within the System and (3) try to define what the 
System could look like in the future regarding the proposals made by the actors the past six months 
when this thesis begun. It is about providing actors in the standardization system with the necessary 
awareness to predict and react to potential changes in the compensation possibilities inherent in the 
system. In order to achieve this as mentioned earlier, the thesis provides: an overview of the factors 
that created the current system, including the development of the market and relevant SSO‟s; an 
analysis of the value structures that comprise the system; and a prognosis of the potential changes 
facing the system grounded in current challenges proposed by actors in the system. These milestones 
are used as a knowledge base to reach the objective of the study which is to provide an overview of the 
standardization system that allows actors in the telecommunications industry to predict changes in the 
compensation possibilities for major IP-holders in the System. 
1.4 Delimitations  
Concerning the scale of the telecommunication industry and actors involved it became necessary to 
make some delimitations in order to be able to grasp this problem area. The delimitations made 
concern geographical, SSO‟s, actors and timeline issues. The study focuses on what is happening 
within Europe and the telecommunications industry and its SSO‟s. Since there are several kinds of 
standards, this study is limited to focusing on those concerning telecommunications that are de jure 
and open as well as promoting interoperability/comparability. The extensive number of actors in the 
telecommunication industry makes it almost impossible to consider all actors involved and their 
individual roles in any given setting, therefore in this study the focus is on the major IP-holders, their 
roles and the IP licensees involved. Since the discussion about changes in the SSO‟s has been going on 
for a while and is not nearly finished, the study will concentrate on major events before the thesis 
began in November 2005, and projected possible results of the discussion.   
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2. Methodology 
As stated in the introduction the main objective of this study is to provide an overview of the 
standardization system that allows actors in the telecommunication industry to predict changes in the 
compensation possibilities for major IP-holders in the System. In this following chapter the 
methodology behind how the thesis was outlined and the information for the analysis and conclusion 
gathered will be outlined. 
 
The corner stone of this thesis is to look at probable future scenarios that could influence the 
compensation possibilities for the major IP-holders in the telecommunication‟s value chain. These 
probable scenarios are a product of discussions taking place with a Swedish major IP-holder within the 
telecommunications industry and some of the proposals actually used during the discussions in the 
SSO‟s by different key actors. The vision is to create solutions that can help in avoiding compensation 
losses in the future, but the aim is to discuss whether or not these scenarios are probable. To achieve 
the study‟s objective information and a thorough understanding of the System at work today must be 
gathered and analyzed. 
 
All information gathering, the results and the assumptions made in this study are largely influenced by 
the methods chosen to select and process the information. There are different approaches 
(investigation and collection of data) and ways to gain knowledge (scientific method), which are going 
to be analyzed later in this chapter. The approach used to reach conclusions is presented in figure 02 
and is divided in three stages: theoretical, empirical and analytical. In this study only qualitative 
methods such as questionnaires and individual interviews have been used in different stages of the 
study to gather information. There is a point in using both quantitative and qualitative methods 
because in this way they compensate each others weaknesses. However, due to the nature of the study 
and limited response to the questionnaire that was sent out the study because of this lack of extensive 
empirical findings is of qualitative nature.  
 
Individual interviews have been used to find out what is common and representative for a company 
active in the standardization organizations.
6
 The interviews held were semi structured with employees 
from a Swedish major IP-holder within the telecommunications industry chosen to gain the basic 
understanding of the System. The questionnaire as well as some additional interviews have been used 
                                                     
6 Göransson Agneta G. (1995), Kvinnor och män i civilingenjörsutbildning,  
Chalmers Tekniska Högskola, Göteborg, Utgiven av Pedagogiska enhet vid Forsknings- och utbildningsbyrån, CTH, ISBN 91-7197-103-3 
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to discover any deviation in how individuals, representing companies from different positions in the 
telecommunication‟s value chain, perceive the System and future possibilities to alterations of it.7  
Why and how this method was chosen to collect the data and some of the disadvantages with choosing 
those as well as difficulties and failures of the methods chosen to collect empirical data in particularly 
will be described later on. 
 
Literature review 
to establish the 
framework of the 
System
More in-depth 
interviews
Interviews with 
representatives within 
a major Swedish IP-
holder within the 
telecommunication 
industry and 
famililarization of the 
toolset of the Sytem Questionnaire
Analysis and 
model creation; 
value network 
and value chain
Analysis and 
scenario creation 
and test
Theoretical framework Empirical block Analysis
 
Figure 02. The approach of the study. 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The approach of this thesis as outlined in figure 02, consisted of three critical steps. The first step was 
to find literature to understand the legal system and raise of standardization organizations. It is 
important to understand fundamental conceptions such as patent and the rights derived from being an 
IP-holder, the legal aspects of being part of a standardization body or consortia and the historical 
development of the telecommunication industry in terms of establishing dominant designs and 
technologies through out the world. To be able to understand the forces driving for change in the 
standardization settings depending on the role and structural control of the different actors involved in 
the telecommunication chain, there was a need of models to analyze and understand the System from 
different perspectives. The aim by using these models was to gain a general description of the current 
System. However, since the system analyzed and described in this thesis is complex in its nature and 
has both tangible and intangible value flows attributed to it, the need for analysis models covering 
both of these attributes is apparent. Many of the models in traditional literature concerning industry 
analysis are concerned more with the material flows and in many cases disregard or undermine the 
intellectual flows and structures that are the source for the main value creation among actors in the 
telecommunication industry. Thus in this study there is a combination of traditional models, tentative 
                                                     
7 ibid 
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models on the subject of intellectual value creation and even models created after the empirical 
information gathering for this study‟s objectives. However, in order to be more pedagogical all models 
used in analyzing the System will be presented in this section regardless of their origin (traditional or 
not).  
 
The theoretical framework begins by presenting and discussing the IA-IP-IC way of thinking that is 
represented throughout this study. The model is used for defining intellectual value by relative 
gradation and originally created by Professor Ulf Petrusson, however some minor changes have been 
made to make the model more relevant to the standardization realities.  
 
The standardization value network focuses on describing the system of standardization-related 
processes, and on mapping the flow of value throughout this system. The idea behind this model is 
that value is added through various contributive processes until one reaches the market, where value 
flows in the other direction, in the form of compensation for the value-generating activities. This 
model depicts how legislative normative structures, regulatory normative structures and specifications 
within standardization interact to form standardization creation and implementation. The model 
originates in the material gathered during the interviews and applies the value definition model 
created by Professor Ulf Petrusson.  
 
In order to understand the industry better Porter‟s five forces has been used to analyze the situation 
statically. The model is used as a first step in understanding the forces that create and change the rules 
of doing business within the industry. In this study the model has been used to describe the same 
industry but from two different actors‟ perspective to gain the most holistic picture possible.   
 
The telecommunication value chain is influenced from the traditional material chain way of thinking 
but with a value creation dimension to it. Thus the model looks more like a network and not a chain, 
where the flows (intellectual, virtual and material) between the different actors are shown. The model 
is almost entirely based on the empirical material gathered during the interviews with the large IP-
holder in the telecommunications industry.  
 
Together all these models will provide the means for understanding and analyzing the 
telecommunication industry and its actors. In this way one is able to describe and analyze reality to 
identify potential conflicts within the system and thus the triggers or means of change. The next step is 
testing possible future scenarios to see if they are possible indeed and what the consequences of a 
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8 
change would be for actors involved. A short description of the benefits, disadvantages and the 
modifications of the models chosen for the analysis and description of the industry will now follow.  
2.1.1 Petrusson’s IA – IP – IC Model 
In order to achieve a useful description of the standardization system, and the activities therein, it will 
be necessary to analyze a few key concepts in greater depth. This need arises partly from the 
complexity of these terms, but also from the fact that they have often been used indiscriminately and 
interchangeably, without any concerns as to establishing an internally consistent framework for their 
usage. One such term is intellectual value. This term is critical to any description of activities in the 
knowledge economy, as most if not all analysts agree that the preeminent value transactions of the 
new economy will not be material, or the sometimes uncomfortable hybrid of the intellectual and the 
material, monetary value, but will rather be entirely intellectual in nature. Naturally, such a crucial and 
untested concept will be subject to a number of attempts to explain and define it, ranging from the 
uselessly vague
8
 to the inappropriately specific
9
. When establishing the theoretical framework of this 
thesis, therefore, the problem was not a lack of available definitions but a surfeit. Very few of these 
definitions, however, were able to meet the theoretical needs of the thesis, or suited to describe the 
intellectual value development as it applied to standardization. Thus a definition of some key concepts 
is necessary to make in the beginning in order for everyone reading this report to have the same basic 
idea when it comes to these concepts. 
2.1.2 The Advantages of a Value Network Approach 10 
A value network provides three primary benefits over traditional forms of mapping value transfers 
within systems – added complexity, added detail, and added flexibility. The network perspective adds 
complexity to the task of mapping value by providing a two-dimensional interface for the process, as 
opposed to the traditional vertical or horizontal lines of value transfer. This reflects the understanding 
that value transfer dynamics are rarely linear, and must, for example, incorporate transfer structures 
which can affect actors both in the beginning, middle, and end of the system being mapped, 
concurrently in order to provide a map approximating real-life relationships. At the same time, the 
value transfer structures must obviously be able to transfer value in more than one or two directions at 
once, something which is difficult to make comprehensible in a one-dimensional representation. In the 
                                                     
8 “Intellectual capital is knowledge that can be exploited for some money-making or other useful purpose.” 
9 “[T]he difference between the book value of an organization (based on tangible assets) and the market value.” – Incubator‟s glossary, 
Promitheas, http://www.promitheas.com/glossary.php 09/02/05 
10 “The key business question in the knowledge economy is, “How is value created?” The traditional answer to that question is –  “through 
the value chain.” The value chain model, however, is a linear mechanistic model of business that is based on the industrial age production 
line. Such a mechanistic model is simply inadequate to understand the complexities of value in the knowledge economy.”  Understanding 
Value Networks, Verna Allee Associates 
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value network drawn up for this thesis, this two-dimensional freedom helps demonstrate the effects of 
standardization organs and technical standards on value dynamics within the system, as these 
phenomena exist outside the traditional, actor-based value chain, yet have a substantial impact on the 
structure of value flows within the system. 
 
The added detail that is possible to portray through a value network is derived mainly from the fact 
that the intellectual value network focuses on processes and activities in the system, rather than using 
an actor-based classification system. While the mapping of actors has a definite role in viewing value 
transfer systems and simplifies the attribution of action and value flows to real-life entities, the 
depiction of each actor as a homogenous, closed entity with a single, undifferentiated effect on the 
value dynamics within the system. As soon as one wishes to understand exactly what process and 
which activities create or affect value, a nuanced perspective is necessary. in this way, the value 
network can increase understanding both of external relations but also of internal processes, which is a 
clear advantage to most companies. When portraying the specific dynamics of the standardization 
system, this process-focus helps arrange processes in an orderly format demonstrating their effects on 
value dynamics, rather than having the process constantly double back and bounce from actor to actor. 
 
Finally, a value network approach provides far greater flexibility than traditional methods of mapping 
value systems, partly by combining the two advantages already mentioned. The two-dimensional 
approach, for example, allows for several different kinds of processes and actors to be mapped – as 
there is no longer a linear progression, either chronological or in terms of closeness to the market, 
relatively static influences such as normative structures can be mapped next to dynamic market actors. 
Flexibility is also achieved through the fact that it is no longer quite as necessary to „pigeonhole‟ each 
entity – if, for example, one intends to place Ericsson into the standardization value network, one 
would have to place them in almost every single category of value-affecting entities, with constant 
market interactions on every level and value flows in every direction. Mapping Ericsson‟s separate 
processes into the same, on the other hand, allows one to precisely and accurately link a number of 
specific activities to their place in and effect on the value transfer system. For this reason, the value 
network can be adapted to far more situations than the traditional methods of mapping value transfer 
flows.  
2.1.3 Limitations of the value network 
While a value network provides a dimension of understanding that is absent from the traditional value 
chain model, and illuminates some of the otherwise hidden transfers of value in the system, there are 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
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of course limitations to such a model as well. As mentioned, the intellectual value network is primarily 
a map of dynamic processes and the interactions of those processes in generating and impacting value. 
While this has its advantages, it is clear that for many strategic decisions it is preferable to use models 
that are actor-oriented, and focus on showing the relationships of entire actors within the system. 
Relative competitive positions are not easily demonstrated with a network approach to value mapping, 
as each actor is sub-divided into its various functions. On the other hand, the value network helps 
identify strategic „choke points‟ in the value flows of the system, and gives an understanding of the 
underpinnings of the market dynamic, rather than the current landscape. For the purposes of this thesis, 
it was felt that a more generic, detailed view of the standardization system dynamics was needed, and 
that the relative positions of actors in that system could be mapped with a more traditional value chain. 
2.1.4 Porter’s model for Industry Analysis 
To gain structural control a company has to be aware of the market it is active within. The market, and 
thus the industry have to be thoroughly analyzed in order to identify opportunities and threats - that 
can become an opportunity. Porter has developed such a model that enables the external analysis of a 
company‟s environment. The five forces model by Porter11 is an outside-in business strategy tool that 
is used to analyze the attractiveness of an industry structure. The tool can preferable be used to get a 
better understanding of a new market and to 
identify where businesses, products or services 
will have the potential to be profitable as well as 
to study the rules of success in the established 
markets. The fundamental idea is that a business 
success will be determined by Porter‟s five 
forces: the bargaining power of (1) suppliers and 
(2) buyers, the (3) rivalry among incumbent 
firms, and the threat from (4) substitutes and (5) 
new entrants, as illustrated in the figure 0. 
 
Using Porter‟s structures of five has its 
limitations.
12
 The model provides the company with a static picture or a snapshot of the existing 
market for a product-based company. It does not take changes into consideration, which in other 
                                                     
11 Porter, M, (2004) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. Free Press, New York. 
 
12 Hill, C. W. L. and Jones, G. R. (2001) Strategic Management Theory, Fifth edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 
 
Figure 03. Porter’s Five Forces 
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words means that it is not dynamic and takes under consideration only one of the company‟s roles on 
the market. Keeping this in mind will bring us closer to the truth and enable us to see the result with a 
critical eye. Since the market is defined by changes and is a dynamic environment, we will have to 
adjust the strategy on each given situation. When analyzing the market with the help of the structures 
of five it is important to keep two things in mind; how the analyzed company will address the 
competitive marketplace and how it will implement and support its day-to-day operations. In this 
study Porter‟s five forces model is applied with two different actors as the focus in order to obtain a 
better picture of reality, since on actor can have different roles depending on which actors one focuses 
on to describe all the others. In this way some of the disadvantages with the model are neutralized. 
2.1.5 The Intellectual value chain 
A material chain is created through the integration of 
different actors on the market (figure 04). To produce 
a product and supply it to the market a material chain 
is created and the product has to pass through all the 
stages to reach the end consumer. Through the 
material chain, the product will be passed from one 
actor to another until it reaches the desired form and 
the delivered to the customer. However, thus in the 
material value chain only the money flows for the 
physical product compensation are regarded, in the telecommunication filed there are more flows and 
actors that are interesting from a structural control perspective. 
 
In the real world the truth is more complicated and there are more actors involved in the process as the 
value flows increase in number. There are three main value flows; material, virtual and intellectual. 
The last two regard intangible asset movements and are in particular of interest in the 
telecommunication industry. A typical value chain for the telecommunication industry will be 
presented later in this study and is largely influenced from the information gathered during the 
interviews. The chain that looks more like a network is a hybrid value chain including all three types 
of assets mentioned earlier as well as a fourth flow i.e. monetary flow.  
2.2 Empirical Block 
The empirical block contains the methodology as to how the empirical information in this study was 
gathered. The main source of all empirical information is the interviews made at a major IP-holder 
Figure 04. The material value chain 
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within the telecommunication industry in Sweden. The information gathered is not presented as such 
but is the ground for many models made during this study and the source of some of the scenarios 
tested in the end. 
2.2.1 The interviews 
The scientific method for gaining knowledge in a specific subject can be described with the help of the 
two philosophical traditions; epistemology and ontology. Epistemology is one kind of knowledge 
theory, while ontology is the way the world is characterized and is synonymous to metaphysics even if 
they do not have the same charge as the word metaphysics.
13
 Ontology can be divided into different 
theoretical starting points where the two extremes are realism and idealism. The authors describe 
realism as a conviction that people can get the true picture of the world while idealism means the 
knowledge never can be separated from consciousness.
14
 In other words one can see that the difference 
between epistemology and ontology are not quite obvious.  
 
In this study since most of the empirical material is taken from interviews, a true picture of the reality 
was not anticipated to be found. Therefore the authors‟ own consciousness and interpretation are 
thought to have played a significant role in how the reality was perceived in the end. In other words 
the knowledge derived in this study is believed to be more close to idealism than realism. 
 
Within ontology there is a distinction between subject and object also made when idealism and realism 
are concerned. Some authors believe that the scientific tradition of objectivism is positive because it is 
implied that knowledge and the theories about it can be explained through cause and effect 
relationships.
15
 In other words this means that the human behavior is decided both socially and 
biologically before hand. Andersson makes a connection between the subjectivist traditions to the non 
positivist since it will mean that the social world can not be explained with a theory that assumes that 
everything is done according to a set of rules.
16
 This means that the social nature cannot be studied 
without studying the human participation. Since the reality will be influenced by the observer and thus 
could be explained in many different ways rather than one correct way, will the picture of the System 
presented in this study be objective. In other words will reality as presented in this study be subjective.  
 
                                                     
13 Sohlberg B. M, Sohlberg P. (2001) Kunskapens former – Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmentod. Liber AB, Stockholm. 
14 ibid 
15 Andersson C. (2000) Kunskapssyn och lärande – I samhälle och arbetsliv. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
Sohlberg B. M, Sohlberg P. (2001) Kunskapens former – Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmentod. Liber AB, Stockholm. 
16 Andersson C. (2000) Kunskapssyn och lärande – I samhälle och arbetsliv. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
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According to Trost and Jacobsen there are two kinds of interviews; qualitative and quantitative.
17
 A 
qualitative interview is characterized by the easy questions that are asked and the complex answers 
that are received. After having an interview like that the interviewer has gathered a lot of complex 
material which with a lot of work and analysis will result in many interesting patterns, opinions etc. 
Many believe that qualitative studies are pre-studies for the quantitative interviews.
18
 The quantitative 
method, on the other hand, provides an overall picture which gives increased understanding of the 
social processes and their context.
19
 Quantitative studies are believed to be better because they are less 
speculative than the qualitative and therefore people can understand the outcome easier. In this study 
both qualitative and quantitative interviews have been carried out. The interviews were conducted in 
two different stages of the study, with the first sessions being qualitative with open questions to 
understand the System, followed by quantitative interviews with more in-depth questions to verify and 
create a better understanding of what was said in the first interview round.  
 
After these fundamental conceptions were identified and analyzed, interviews with representatives 
from Ericsson with different positions and levels of the hierarchy were conducted. The interviews had 
a duration of one hour and the questions asked were of an open character. The aim was to get 
acquainted with the processes inside Ericsson concerning licensing and standardization work; from 
idea to licensing the technology. Which questions were asked during the interviews depended a lot on 
the position of the interviewee and thus the level of knowledge on the specific area. The information 
gathered had also a higher purpose, namely to understand the custom way of doing business within 
standardization bodies. The purpose was to get a feel for the system today and start to identify possible 
conflicts that would help in conceptualizing the different scenarios threatening the compensation of 
the rightful IP-holders. The information gathered during the interviews together with the authors own 
analysis of the System gave birth to the standardization value network that was connected to the 
intellectual and manufacturing value chain of the telecommunication industry (see figure 10).  
 
The interviews in this stage were divided into two steps. In the first stage the interviewees were send a 
standard questionnaire containing five key question areas. As stated in the questionnaire they 
represented the viewpoints of several different actors and not necessarily those of the authors. 
However, the questions were thought cover the main areas of the thesis and therefore the interviewees 
were asked to comment upon them from their company‟s perspective. In the second part the 
                                                     
17 Trost, J. (1997). Kvalitativa intervjuer, Studentlitteratur, Lund 
Jacobsen D. I. (2002) Vad, hur och varför? Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
18 Trost, J. (1997). Kvalitativa intervjuer, Studentlitteratur, Lund 
19 Holme, I.M. and Solvang, B.K. (1997) Forskningsmetodik – Om kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden 
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interviewees were once more contacted to comment their responses more in depth and in that way 
verify themselves what they have said is truly what they think. In this phase an expert with a lot of 
experience within the telecommunication field was interviewed through a telephone conference that 
hade a duration of one hour.  The question asked during this interview were based in the findings from 
the previous interviews and they had therefore a more statement character were the interviewee was 
provoked to confirm or reject the information and believes previously gathered.  
2.2.2 The questionnaire 
In step three, a questionnaire and interviews with other representatives from the telecommunication 
value chain, besides Ericsson were used as tolls to gather more information. For this stage key actors 
in the value chain were identified. To have as big diversity as possible actors representing different 
roles on the value chain were contacted by phone and e-mail. Unfortunately not all actors contacted 
were willing to participate in the study. The authors found the reason for the companies not wanting to 
partake in the study to be a combination of the subject being too confidential to talk about or that it 
was hard to get in touch with the right people dealing with this kind of issues. However, in the end 
some interviews were conducted but had not the diversity that was intended in the beginning. The 
actors interviewed were representatives from Ericsson.  
 
According to Trost, questionnaires have a lot in common with personal interviews.
20
 There is though 
one big difference between the techniques, which is that all questionnaires are characterized by the 
fact that it is the interviewee that notes the answers to the questions and therefore there is no 
interviewer. There are two types of questionnaires, according to Trost.
21
 One is sent to the 
interviewees and the other is given to them in person. The type that Trost focuses on is the one that is 
sent to people, which is what has been used in this study.
22
 The process of doing a questionnaire 
always starts with identifying the objective of the study. In this master thesis one of the aims is to find 
out the different drivers for the actors involved in the telecommunication‟s value chain. By using the 
questionnaire an identification of the IP and money flows in the telecommunication‟s value chain is 
done to later identify the parameters that trigger the different actors towards change. For this purpose a 
short questionnaire was sent to representatives from companies representing the different actors in the 
System. 
 
                                                     
20 Trost J. (1994). Enkätboken, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
15 
The second choice that has to be made is if the survey should be qualitative or quantitative. A 
quantitative study is when numbers or numerical words are used. Qualitative thinking means avoiding 
these kinds of comparisons.
23
 Qualitative and quantitative surveys are possible to combine. Since the 
purpose of the questionnaire in this master thesis is to find out what drives the different actors to 
wanting to change the rules of the System and thus the value drivers, the questionnaire is qualitative.  
 
The third thing that has to be considered when preparing a questionnaire is, according to Trost, which 
population should be included.
24
 The questionnaire in this master thesis includes key persons working 
with the standardization and licensing department within their company. If the whole population can 
not be included in the survey representative selection of interviewees has to be made to get a faire 
opinion of the preferences of the chosen population according to Trost.
25
 How the selection should be 
made and how big it should be needs to be decided from the beginning. In this study it was decided to 
send the questionnaires to key companies representing the different actors within the 
telecommunication‟s value chain. The companies were chosen based on a number of significant 
factors, the determination of which was arrived at both through the interviews with a Swedish major 
IP-holder within the telecommunications industry, as well as studies of the drivers of standardization 
work. These factors included the actors‟ market significance, their influence in standardization 
organizations, and their role in illustrating the key problems discussed in the thesis. While it was 
impossible to quantify these factors, and thus objectively rank the significance of each actor, as the 
factors were chosen on a qualitative basis, it was nonetheless possible to informally validate our 
selection methods through noting reactions and attitudes during the interviews. Based on this, it was 
concluded that the companies chosen were satisfactorily representative of our thesis problem, and 
constituted some of the key actors within the telecommunications industry.  
 
According to Trost it is desirable to reach a high level of homogeneity when most questionnaires are 
considered.
26
 This is because homogeneity makes it possible to compare answers and make statements 
about the opinions of a whole population, which is why the questions in the questionnaire send to the 
different representatives were standard disregarding the type of actor they represent in the 
telecommunication‟s value chain. However, unfortunately although the questionnaire was sent to over 
15 representatives from different companies but the answer frequency was very low. The reasons 
behind this low answering frequency is either the sensitivity nature of the questions asked on the 
questionnaire or/and the difficulty in finding the right people in the companies willing and able to 
                                                     
23 ibid 
24 ibid 
25 ibid 
26 Trost J. (1994). Enkätboken, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden 
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answer the questions asked. On the other hand a major Swedish network operator/operator answered 
to the questions, which made this study even more interesting having opinions from the two influential 
roles in a standardization process; the IP-holders and the operators. Having answers from this Swedish 
operator‟s employees makes it hard to generalize the answers for all the operators. However, after 
studying the resent events in the SSO‟s and taking into account the answers from the interviewees with 
the Swedish major IP-holder, one can say that the answers given from the Swedish major operator 
have confirmed what has been previously stated during the interviews and is in accordance with what 
is happening in the SSO arena right now that will be later discussed in this thesis.     
2.3 Analysis 
Jacobsen, as Andersson, talks about ontology and epistemology and refers to the two extreme cases of 
positivism and comprehension base attitude.
27
 Jacobsen also makes a distinction between inductive 
and deductive way of gathering information as two extreme cases.
28 
The deductive method is used 
when a researcher searches after empirical information that confirms the theoretical hypothesis and 
thus use the positivisms way of thinking. The downside with this method is that important information 
that is not seen as relevant is discarded. On the other hand there is the inductive way which is 
connected to a more understanding-based attitude according to Jacobsen.
29
 In this study a combination 
of the two (deductive and inductive) was used in order to have a broader scope. Studying a company 
in the telecommunication‟s value chain is a good way to describe the environment they are active in 
and goes in line with the inductive way of searching after theory that support the study‟s objective.  
 
According to Jacobsen this means that the observer/author/investigator will enter reality without 
almost any prejudice and than try to construct theories based on the empirical information gathered.
30
 
However, in reality it is impossible not to have any prejudice, and in this study the interviews were 
conducted after the theory was selected, but constituted the grounds for the creation of the some of the 
models used for the analysis of the System. This mean that the choice of theory in a way influenced 
how the information was interpreted during the interviews and all questions asked were derived from 
the specific theoretical way of thinking. However, in this study the material from the interviews was 
perceived with an open mind and the choice of theory and implications thereof were more dominating 
                                                     
27 Jacobsen D. I. (2002) Vad, hur och varför? Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen. Studentlitteratur, 
Lund. 
Andersson C. (2000) Kunskapssyn och lärande – I samhälle och arbetsliv. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
28 Jacobsen D. I. (2002) Vad, hur och varför? Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen. Studentlitteratur, 
Lund. 
29 ibid 
30 Jacobsen D. I. (2002) Vad, hur och varför? Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen. Studentlitteratur, 
Lund. 
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in the analysis of this study. In other words there was an attempt made to combine induction and 
deduction throughout the study and thus the thesis. Both the material gathered during the interviews 
and the theoretical framework used in this thesis, set the grounds for the understanding of the System 
and are two sources of information that complement each other to find the truth.  
 
As mentioned earlier this thesis is done in cooperation with a major Swedish IP-holder, and thus the 
objective and scope of the study was developed to include the companies own issues and interests in 
the matter at hand. However, the thesis is of interest for all active actors in the telecommunication 
industry since the scope of the study has been developed in that way. It has been in both the major 
Swedish IP-holder‟s interest and this thesis objective to see the issues from a broader and more holistic 
point of view. The issue of standardization and compensation opportunities concerns the whole value 
chain and thus all actors and their interests are of interest, which makes it highly relevant to start by 
establishing a broad understanding of the system to narrow down and concentrate in the areas of 
specific interest.  
 
To gain all information necessary to understand and analyze the system to drive relevant conclusions 
in the form of probable scenarios affecting compensation opportunities in the standardization 
organizations, interviews, public documents and surveys were used as information sources. When the 
information was gathered and the models chosen or created the information went into the models and 
created a picture of the telecommunication industry, its actors and driving forces for control and role 
creation. After that four scenarios were chosen according to the information gathered from the 
interviews and the discussions on the different standardization forums. These scenarios were then 
analyzed as to what effects they would have if implemented for all parties involved.  
2.4 Validity and reliability 
The thesis is partly based on analysis of different kinds and as the chain never is stronger than its 
weakest link a conducted analysis may be more destructive than constructive. Our ability to interpret 
and use the different models must therefore be evaluated. In the final stage of this study our 
knowledge and understanding will be at a general level and there may be some blind spots in the 
theoretical coverage of the models. The level of uncertainty raises when most of the models that 
describe the System, the actors and their drives are a product of the authors own interpretations of 
reality. However, the material used for the interpretations were gathered through theoretical studies 
and interviews conducted with people involved in the different processes taking part in the 
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telecommunication‟s value chain, which should increase the level of validity and reliability of the 
models.  
 
There is a point in having interviews in different stages of the study, not only to gather more 
information but also to confirm that what was derived from the first set of interviews is true for others 
active in the value chain, besides the major IP-holder the interviews were held with. The fact that the 
scenarios are tested through a discussion with representatives from this IP-holder active in the 
standardization and licensing work makes the scenarios more plausible and thus the description and 
relevance of those.  
4. Defining intellectual value 
 This section presents the definition of intellectual value as used in this thesis. It outlines the need for 
creating a definition of intellectual value that is more rigorous and applicable to the standardization 
system than what is currently available, and introduces a model for this definition, based on the 
theories of Petrusson. The theoretical and philosophical basis for the model is discussed, and the 
model is presented and discussed. The limitations of the model are pointed out, and the model is 
redefined to apply to the standardization system. 
 
In order to achieve a useful description of the standardization system, and the activities therein, it will 
be necessary to analyze a few key concepts in greater depth. This need arises partly from the 
complexity of these terms, but also from the fact that they have often been used indiscriminately and 
interchangeably, without any concerns as to establishing an internally consistent framework for their 
usage. One such term is intellectual value. This term is critical to any description of activities in the 
knowledge economy, as most if not all analysts agree that the preeminent value transactions of the 
new economy will not be material, or the sometimes uncomfortable hybrid of the intellectual and the 
material, monetary value, but will rather be entirely intellectual in nature. Naturally, such a crucial and 
untested concept will be subject to a number of attempts to explain and define it, ranging from the 
uselessly vague31 to the inappropriately specific32. When establishing the theoretical framework of 
this thesis, therefore, the problem was not a lack of available definitions but a surfeit. Very few of 
these definitions, however, were able to meet the theoretical needs of the thesis, or suited to describe 
the intellectual value development as it applied to standardization. What was needed was a definition 
                                                     
31 “Intellectual capital is knowledge that can be exploited for some money-making or other useful purpose.” – HPC definition,  
32 “[T]he difference between the book value of an organization (based on tangible assets) and the market value.” – Incubator‟s glossary, 
Promitheas 
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that was internally consistent while specific enough to be applicable to real world examples. At the 
same time, the model needed to reflect the dynamic activities of standards creation as a value-creating 
process. 
4.1 Social Constructionism 
The theoretical basis for this model was created by Petrusson, and is the result of the application of the 
precepts of social constructionism to intellectual value creation and management. The social 
constructionist philosophy in turn, was pioneered by Berger and Luckmann,33 and is based, somewhat 
simply put, on the tenet that all knowledge, no matter how self-evident or undeniable, is the result of 
individual perception and, more importantly, the social interactions that form in the intersections of 
different perceptions. While different schools of social constructionism take different approaches to 
the ontological or epistemological nature of reality, there is widespread agreement that no matter what 
the nature of reality is, our perception of reality will always be far more important to understand. The 
social constructionist philosophy as such will not be the subject of in-depth analysis in this thesis, but 
it constitutes a theoretical cornerstone of the models created to describe the standardization system, 
and for this reason it was considered necessary to outline the fundamentals of social constructionism 
in order to explain some of the basic assumptions on which the models are based. Some of these 
assumptions can be stated quite simply: 
 
 Reality is our perception of reality, as we cannot approach reality without perceiving it; 
 All our perceptions are constructed through social interactions; thus 
 Reality is a social construction. 
 
These very simple concepts can be used to build up a critical, function-based approach to examining 
and deconstructing legal, social and business concepts, which is the basis of the approach pioneered by 
Petrusson. It is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis to understand or accept, for example, 
radical technological constructionism, but in order to understand the models used, the reader must be 
aware that they rest on certain assumptions: that value in a technological innovation is derived 
primarily from social perception of the innovation; that value can be increased through constructive 
activities (referred to as constructive activities or value packaging) that shape the social perception of 
the innovation; and that the constructive activities that shape social perception of an innovation can be 
defined and mapped to understand how real-world activities create value in an intellectualized context 
such as the standardization system. These activities, understood through this approach, are what 
                                                     
33 Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann 
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constitute intellectual value management. Within this thesis, two models based on the concepts of 
intellectual value management will be applied to the standardization system, to enable a critical 
understanding of that system: the model of the three arenas on which intellectual management 
activities take place, and the model of the transformation from intellectual assets to intellectual 
property, and from intellectual property to intellectual capital, which results from intellectual value 
management activities. 
 
4.2 The Three Arenas 
Judicial
BusinessAdministrative
Value 
Extraction
 
 
The model of the three arenas is a tool for mapping value-creating activities by actors from a 
communicative, social constructivist perspective. It was created as a response to the inadequacy of 
traditional value chain models in describing the emerging intellectualized economy, and to provide a 
more accurate mapping of how to assess an action or creation in terms of its full potential for value 
extraction.  
 
The model builds on the concept that all value is primarily created through action, rather than simply 
discovered or exploited. This means that different levels of value can be created from the same basic 
foundation, depending on the kind of actions applied to that foundation, and that the value invested by 
actors in value-structuring activities is often more important, and more economically exploitable, than 
the initial substrate upon which they acted. This reflects the specialized, service-focused reality of the 
intellectualized economy – the value of any specific phenomenon in this economy is more heavily 
Figure 05. The three arenas 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
21 
dependent on the refinement it has undergone than its original „raw material‟. This is true in all 
industries and markets, but is particularly true when the phenomena involved are intangible, as it is 
almost impossible to categorically divide the intangible raw material from its intangible refinements. 
 
At the same time, the model incorporates, and demonstrates, the concept that all value is a social 
construction, and is in reality a communicative function. The value a product or good is not immutable 
and objective, but is in fact a result of communicative actions building a brand, creating supply and 
demand, and leveraging the value of the product through services and ancillary offers. For an 
intellectual creation to have any value beyond its most basic, therefore, it must be possible to 
communicate that value well, and to as large a number of diverse actors as possible. If one can 
communicate the value of ones constructions fully to the entire world, without doubt or disagreement, 
the exploitable economic potential of that creation will be fully realized. Taking this into account, the 
model shows how it is necessary for an actor wanting to create value to strive to create optimal value 
communication - and ultimately, to extract value in its various forms, whether it be in the form of 
economic winnings or further structural creation. 
 
Finally, the model takes these concepts and describes how value-creation with the goal of 
communicating value fully can be mapped onto three separate arenas. These arenas cover the range of 
behavior available to commercial actors, and encompass the institutions and structures already in place 
in society that enable and facilitate value creation. Value extraction is a natural consequence enabled 
by this constructive process, and optimally takes place in the intersection between structures on each 
arena. As the three arenas are heavily dependent on social norms, institutions, and establishments, they 
reflect, naturally, the social conditions that apply to the chosen field – in a geographic area where the 
intellectual property rights system is outdated or easily circumvented, for example, it is unlikely that 
there will be strong existing structures in the administrative or judicial arena. It is necessary, however, 
to fully understand each of the arenas before attempting to apply them to a chosen region, field, or 
industry. 
4.2.1 The Judicial Arena 
The judicial arena adjudicates disputes and thereby provides the function of acting to validate value 
constructions. A construction only carries value to the extent that is effectively communicated and 
accepted by all actors – if its validity is in dispute, the value that can be extracted or leveraged is 
minimized. A court provides an effective communicative support by linking the disputed matter to a 
series of well established communicative traditions and structures – the outcome of a trial is supported 
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by the democratic system and the constitutional system establishing the authority of the court. Once 
this authority lends its legitimacy an interpretation of a communicative action, it becomes as accepted 
as any other communicative action supported by the court, and, by extension, supported by the state. 
 
An example of how transactions and relationships exist in the form gain or regain legitimacy through 
actions on the judicial arena would be a dispute over the validity of a contract. A contract is, simply 
expressed, a communicative action between two or more parties, containing certain assurances and 
reciprocal commitments. The only real value vested in the contract as such is the belief in the 
reliability of those assurances and commitments – the belief between the parties that reciprocity will 
be honored, and the belief by third parties that they can use the assurances in the contract to predict the 
behavior of the contracting parties. These beliefs form the basis for any economic transactions made 
based on or relating to the contract. 
 
In a dispute between the parties, stemming from a difference of interpretation or a refusal to honor the 
contract, the legitimacy of any assurances with that contract is removed. It is no longer possible to use 
the terms of the contract to predict the actions of the parties, and it is therefore impossible to use the 
contract as a basis for economic considerations. Expressed in terms of the legitimacy of 
communicative value structures, it is clear to see that a contract which is not being honored has a very 
low communicative value – it no longer serves as a signifier of intent, and can only be used to derive, 
at best, the unreliability of the party in breach. 
 
Another example would be the assignation of a patent. While an administrative institution such as a 
patent office may make a determination of the patentability of an innovation, it usually makes no 
deeper inquiry as to the proper ownership of said patent rights. If the assignation of rights comes into 
dispute, the otherwise paramount question of patentability becomes a matter of secondary importance, 
as it will be impossible to extract any value whatsoever from the patent without being able to clearly 
and definitively communicate ownership of it. In this way, the verification attainable on the judicial 
arena becomes a prerequisite for extracting value from the structures created on both administrative 
and business arenas, and a court decision becomes a communicative value creating structure in its own 
right. 
4.2.2 The Administrative Arena 
Within the administrative arena, we find those support structures that exist to establish and help 
establish structures that are used in other arenas. This is done primarily through the application of 
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some form of recognized, reliable criteria that are applied equally to value structures, and the 
communication of fulfillment of those criteria. The value, as such, of this communication is dependent 
on the legitimacy and trust that the administrative institution enjoys – usually such legitimacy is 
created thorough the creation of bureaucratic machinery that ensures the exact and equal application of 
the criteria in each case. Once outside actors accept that the institution applies its criteria reliably, 
equally, and transparently, it will accept the transferal of legitimacy onto other value creations. In 
order to achieve this level of acceptance, most institutions in the administrative tend to serve not only 
the purposes of actors in the business arena, but also secondary (or in some cases primary) objectives 
that are of value to other actors or society at large. Most patent offices, for example, were created to 
ensure that patents fulfill a secondary goal of allowing innovation to benefit society, and in this 
process they create a legitimacy that is conferred on the patent institution. Part of this legitimacy 
derives from a presumed connection with the judicial arena, which is expected to uphold the validity 
and enforceability of the structures established or accepted by the administrative, however, such a 
connection is not a necessary prerequisite for the legitimacy of administrative structures. 
 
One example of a structure existing on and acting within the administrative arena would be the ISO 
certification process established by the International Organization for Standardization. Even though 
the technical ISO standards are created by actors often established or with vested interests in the 
business arena, the function filled by the organization is that of an administrative institution (it is also 
worth noting that many of the members of ISO are affiliated with governments and governmental 
institutions). ISO has set up a bureaucratic structure that inspects, tests, and assesses the compliance of 
certain practices with certain criteria, depending on the specific ISO-standard. This machinery conveys 
legitimacy by consistent application of reliable standards, which acts as a communicative signifier of 
quality commensurate with that of any actor awarded the same ISO certification. The value that this 
communicative signifier confers in terms of legitimacy is directly equal to the level of trust in the ISO 
process that actors have – as long as the process is transparent, and clearly and incontrovertibly 
sufficiently rigorous to assess minimum conformity with the ISO standard, that same trust is conferred 
to the actors who have obtained ISO certification. 
 
Another example of administrative institutions is patent offices – the national or international patent 
offices are bureaucratic machinery for establishing criteria for patentability. They serve the secondary 
purpose of promoting innovation, and provide protection through the right to exclude for intellectual 
creations, which can then be leveraged into more advanced value structures. The criteria for 
patentability are, essentially, codified in legislation, and are thus as transparent and as reliable as the 
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legal system in question itself. The application of these criteria, in order to determine what can and 
cannot be patented, is done by governmentally established institutions, and thus carries the legitimacy 
of the democratic process to some extent – if nothing else, this official standing provides a strong link 
with the judicial arena, as the assumptions is that an officially granted patent would also be upheld in 
court in the case of a dispute. Without the support of administrative legitimacy and judicial validity, 
the means of excluding others from utilizing proprietary technical innovations other than secrecy 
would be substantially limited. Naturally this doesn‟t mean that a patent granted by an official patent 
office is an incontrovertible communication of either ownership or validity, as many patents can be 
revoked or challenged in court, but it lends structural value to claims of technical value by lending 
them legitimacy. 
4.2.3 The Business Arena 
The business arena is of course the arena on which actors act primarily through market-established 
means to attain market-derived goals. On this arena, any actor is equally capable of creating structures, 
and structural creation is typically given much less scrutiny and insight. There is a tendency to see the 
business arena as a far more „trial-by-fire‟ field than the other two arenas – a structure created on the 
business arena will be validated immediately as soon as it is accepted by other actors, which naturally 
means that the communicative interplay is particularly exposed in this arena. At its most basic level, 
value creation on the business arena is entirely a matter of convincing other actors, by any means, and 
there are no external or fixed principles to which actors must adhere to. In practice, however, the 
actors in the business arena tend to establish normative structures to shape value creation, including 
industry standards, codes of ethical business practice, and streamlined, customary processes. 
Nevertheless, as these normative structures tend to be more flexible and mutable than those existing in 
the other arenas, they tend also to confer less legitimacy on a value structure, which is why actions on 
the business arena still usually depend on support from structures in the other arenas. 
 
The immediacy of validation on the business arena means that it is quite possible for value creation to 
occur and flourish entirely within this arena without first requiring support from structures on the other 
arenas. While an administrative construct with economic significance is rarely seen as worthwhile, and 
a law created without enforceability is typically ignored, a business construct validated only by other 
actors can nonetheless thrive and motivate investment of time and resources. A clear-cut example of 
this would be the institution of television show formats, an industry in which the blueprints for 
television show concepts such as Survivor or Big Brother are traded, invested in, and even licensed. 
These blueprints have not been established or approved by any administrative institution, and there 
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was nothing in existing legislation or case law that supported the use of these concepts as tradable 
intellectual property. Nevertheless, the strong support given to the idea of trading these blueprints by 
actors within the television industry, made it possible for these intellectual creations to enjoy a level of 
support of value leveraging that was equal to structures with firm footing on each of the three arenas. 
This is how the business arena is able to influence the framework of the other arenas; an interest that is 
strongly expressed and tested on the business arena presents a strong case for the establishment of 
structural support mechanisms on the other two, as can be seen now that infringement of the rights to 
television show formats has been successfully argued in court.  
 
At the same time, structures on the business arena can of course be affected, encouraged, or curtailed 
by action on the other two arenas. Passing new legislation expanding the practice of compulsory 
licenses on biotechnological inventions, for example, will change the ways in which innovations in the 
affected field are patented or kept secret, while a court decision determining that the use of asbestos-
lined brake materials are too hazardous to be used or sold will obviously have an effect on the 
particular industry. Creating structures entirely on the business arena can have severe consequences, as 
it is essentially a gamble with structural support – while it is possible for an entirely innovative value 
structure to create support on the other arenas where there previously was none, it is also very possible 
that the inherent legitimacy that can be drawn upon in structures on the other arenas will be used to 
counter business structures by competing or conflicting interests. The flexibility and immediacy of the 
business arena is not always capable of trumping the legitimacy created by the reliability, transparency, 
and predictability of structures created on the other arenas. 
4.3 The three arenas applied to telecom 
standardization  
Within the current standardization system, it is clear that the primary goal of each major actor, 
particularly the major IP-holders is the creation of value in intellectual property through the 
development of structural legitimacy. The tools used for the development of standards and standards-
based networks currently rely heavily on patents and contracts, which almost immediately necessitates 
a connection to both the administrative and judicial arena. Intellectual property rights are typically the 
means by which modern ICT standardization is made possible, and with that prerequisite, the support 
of some form of administrative machinery, and the fall-back of a judicial test of validity becomes 
necessary. Due to the nature of the current telecommunications market, particularly in Europe, 
established support channels for connecting value creation to these arenas are highly lacking. This is 
most likely due to the unusual nature of this market – the hybrid free market structures that arose in 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
26 
the wake of the dismantling of the national telecommunications monopolies present an unusual 
playing field, which has led to a disjunction from the traditional machineries of the three arenas. 
4.3.1 The disjunction between arenas 
After the removal of the telecommunications monopolies in Europe, the development of the market 
was turned over to private actors, operating primarily on the business arena. However, as the 
underlying reasons why the monopolies were initially established were still highly relevant – the need 
for international interoperability and the network externalities of standardized solutions, the market 
did not divide into a large number of smaller actors, but was instead characterized by the organized 
consortia that arose. These groupings of influential actors helped maintain most of the principles of the 
telecommunications monopolies, and established structures to replace them. However, in doing so, 
these consortia established new criteria for value creation – the essentiality of patents, for example, 
became a prime criterion for determining the extent of the value structuring activities possible to 
perform with a patent, and became more important, in some ways, than the technical merits of the 
innovation upon which the patents were based.  
 
In this way the consortia created a machinery that supplanted the traditional machineries of intellectual 
property and validation, with a machinery that was established and supported on the business arena by 
business actors. While it can be argued that the consortia were created to fill the functions of those 
traditional machineries, the consortia can in no way be said to take the independent role of, for 
example, a patent registration office, and have explicitly distanced themselves from both the role of 
considering and establishing essentiality, as well as that of resolving disputes related to licensing terms. 
The end result of this is that many of the essential constructions upon which modern ICT 
standardization rests are almost entirely unrelated to any kind of legitimacy granted by actors on the 
traditional administrative arena, and are untested on the judicial arena. 
4.4 The intellectual value hierarchy  
Measuring the development of structural legitimacy of intellectual is not just a question of ensuring 
that each arena is involved – this is not always a possible or necessary. The goal in creating holistic 
value structures is to transform value from its most basic level into its most structured form, as this 
creates the greatest amount of legitimacy. This process is a result of creating structural support on the 
three arenas, and has been modeled by Petrusson as the transformation of intellectual assets into 
intellectual property, and the transformation of intellectual property into intellectual capital. 
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4.4.1 The IA-IP-IC model of intellectual value management 
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The IA-IP-IC model describes the hierarchical development of intellectual value and helps map the 
activities that contribute to a progression in intellectual value packaging. The three levels of 
intellectual value defined in Petrusson‟s model are, in ascending order: intellectual assets (IA), 
intellectual property (IP), and intellectual capital (IC). The progression of intellectual value into more 
refined and legitimate forms follows this development towards the IC level, and intellectual value 
management is the process of driving this progression – by providing IAM, IPM, and ICM activities, 
actors can shape social perception of their innovations (while the model can be used to explain value 
in all its forms, it is traditionally based on the example of technological innovation, which is 
appropriate for the purposes of this thesis), allowing them to „transform‟ and better exploit the inherent 
value of those innovations.  
 
As an example, we can look at the exploitable value inherent in a unique business model. In Europe, 
currently, the value of such a model can only be exploited to the extent that it can be implemented in 
the actual running of a business, and the exploited value is then the gain in efficiency from the 
adoption of a better model. The business model, within this social context, does not enjoy an 
independent, formally recognized or quantifiable value attribute, but instead, only holds utility value 
which is dependent on circumstance and context. In the United States, however, where the institutions 
on the administrative arena have evolved to allow for patenting business models, the exploitable value 
Figure 06. The IA-IP-IC hierarchy 
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of a business plan is far greater, as it can be treated as property in the form of a saleable patent, in 
addition to its inherent value as a business model. With this formal, social recognition, the business 
plan‟s value to its owner is no longer only useable but also transactionable. It is worth noting that the 
actual plan, of course, carries the same content in either scenario, but the potential to leverage value 
inherent in saleable property can only be realized when that content is constructed in such a way as to 
fit the pathways for formal recognition and communicability established by and relied upon in a social 
context.  
4.4.1.1 Intellectual Assets  
“A claim of what is valuable,” meaning such intellectual value as has not been defined or recognized 
in a commercial setting, including artistic expression, technical concepts, and other undefined value 
which is nevertheless recognized as containing the potential for transformation into formalized value. 
An example of this is know-how – both technical and personal, it is the difficult to define and package 
value that is not easily communicated to other actors. While you can claim that the most valuable 
resource in your company is in the minds of your R&D department staff, you will not, typically, be 
able to sell, license, or borrow against this resource, as the institutions for shaping our perceptions of 
these resources do not exist. The key criterion for determining whether value should be classified as an 
asset or property is thus the possibility to conduct transactions with it. While the definition of a 
transaction as such can be stretched, it nevertheless conveys the sense that intellectual assets is value 
that is so unsupported, structurally, that it cannot be transferred to another actor and still retain its 
value. It is possible, however, with skilled IAM and IPM efforts, to transform IA into IP without such 
institutions – an example would be know-how licensing, where undefined knowledge is nevertheless 
packaged into a financial value proposition. 
 
4.4.1.2 Intellectual Property 
“A claim of a value proposition,” which refers to value that has been packaged and defined to the 
point of achieving such formal recognition as is afforded to property, with all the rights of ownership 
and control this implies. This includes all intellectual value that has attained the status of being 
transactionable, though the traditional way of thinking primarily views intellectual property as 
primarily referring to intellectual property rights. Since the definition of such rights differs from legal 
system to legal system, the definition of IP must be seen as more generic and less limited than the 
traditional understanding, and should not be seen as identical with the traditional, legal understanding 
of intellectual property. Patents constitute an obvious example in most legal systems – through the 
support system of a well-defined social administrative institution such as, in Sweden, the Patent Office 
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(Patent och Registreringsverket), a patent application process is a way of verifying that a technical 
innovation meets the level of intellectual value management necessary for reliable transactions, and 
thus deserves the protection of the courts. The patent still builds on the same underlying innovation 
that can be identified in the form of IA, but now lives up to higher standards of communicability and 
packaging. Note that the patent does not necessarily contain the entirety of the innovation, but 
represents those aspects of the innovation that have reached the level of intellectual property. If the 
innovation has not been sufficiently or properly constructed through appropriate intellectual value 
management activities, a patent application will not be granted –a formal and administrative signal 
indicating this insufficiency (naturally the level of construction that is considered sufficient will be 
highly dependent on the legal system and tradition of the national context). 
 
4.4.1.3 Intellectual Capital 
“A claim of financial capital,” finally, is the last stage of intellectual value construction, in which the 
value is so thoroughly established and communicated that it achieves the characteristics of capital, and 
is possible to use as collateral security in a loan or as the basis for financing. In some legal systems 
this is automatically the case with many patents, as of the granting of the application, since the 
requirements for patentability are set so high, that they indicate a reliability that is also sufficient for 
actors to trust the innovation as intellectual capital. While it is not impossible for value to exist in the 
form of capital without building on the previous level of construction, this is typically not the case. 
There are a few notable exceptions – for example, in his book the Mystery of Capital, Hernando 
DeSoto notes the ability of less formalized economic networks to collateralize reputation and trust in 
individuals, which are aspects that cannot typically be economically transactionable in the sense that 
property can. A parallel to this can be seen in the more westernized possibility of using established 
artistic talent and reputation as a financial security, essentially a form of personal brand management 
that has reached the level of collaterability. However, the typical situation is, as mentioned, one of 
property being a prerequisite for capital – most economic and social institutions feature a cumulative 
sophistication of the interfaces for extracting value, and the ability to trade with something typically 
precedes the ability to collateralize it. Ultimately, however, the potential represented by the 
capitalization of intellectual value is not tied to the existence of any specific social or financial 
institution, but represents the ultimate leveraging of intellectual value possible to attain. 
4.4.2 Chronology of the Model 
It is important to recognize that the progressive construction model of intellectual value management 
does not necessarily correspond to a matching chronological development. The levels of intellectual 
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value are distinct in that they represent hierarchical differences in the level of construction and 
packaging, yet they, and the constructive activities that contribute to the progression in the value 
hierarchy, can coexist simultaneously, and activities that contribute to value construction on one level 
can at the same time contribute equally to structures on a higher level. This is the result of the close 
connection between the value management hierarchy and the relevant market and social context – 
depending on the structures already in place, the levels might be broader or narrower, and synergy 
effects of certain constructive activities can have consequences on every level. For example, if the 
patent application and registration institution in a country has achieved a sufficient level of reliability, 
trust, and efficiency it constitutes a guarantee of value construction on the highest level, the very act of 
obtaining a formal patent from such an institution will not only turn an innovation into intellectual 
property, but immediately into intellectual capital as well, as the understanding of intellectual property 
in that context converges with intellectual capital. 
 
4.5 Applying the intellectual value management model 
to the standardization system 
In order to fully apply Petrusson‟s model to the purpose of the thesis as such, it is first necessary to 
adapt it on a practical level to the activities and processes that go into the creation of standards and the 
extraction of value from standards constructions. The model as such has not been published in a 
finalized state, and is therefore currently only presented within the context of the specific areas and 
activities comprising intellectual value management in entrepreneurial business creation and in smaller 
companies. While it builds on an intellectual framework that can be generalized to apply to any 
discussion of intellectual value, the current state of the still relies builds heavily on certain instances of 
real-world phenomena that are context-specific and fit the small-business entrepreneurial perspective. 
In order for the model to be applicable to the analysis of the standards system, it was necessary to 
examine the more general communicative claims embedded in the model, and then re-contextualize 
the model to conform to the specific activities undertaken by the standards creator. 
 
The first two levels of the intellectual value ladder can easily be adapted to the standards system, as an 
understanding of the value of IA has always been key in industries built on technological innovation, 
and the importance of IP is by now more than clear to the actors taking part in standards collaboration. 
Even if the model, in its current form, explains these concepts through examples that apply to the 
reality of the technology-focused entrepreneur, this focus does not differ greatly from that of the 
standards creator. In both paradigms, intellectual assets are heavily technology-focused (as opposed, 
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for example, to creative cultural output), and intellectual property is understood to be the formal 
means of protection appropriate to such technology-based innovation, i.e. primarily patents and in 
some cases  copyrights. Adapting these concepts and finding practical examples to illustrate the ideas 
of IA and IP was therefore not difficult. The divergence between perspectives, however, becomes 
noticeable when applying the concept of IC to the reality of standards creation, and for this reason it 
was necessary to deconstruct the concept of IC more explicitly. 
4.5.1 Defining Intellectual Capital 
When used to explain the reality of the small business entrepreneur, the definition of IC used by 
Petrusson  builds heavily on the concept of financial capital – of loans and securities, and investment 
underpinnings. These are all financial activities that are familiar and applicable to the reality of the 
entrepreneur, who must be able to manage intellectual value in order to secure funding for projects 
that exist on a very limited financial foundation. From this perspective, the examples used to define IC 
in the preliminary version of the model are very illustrative of the qualities that should be associated 
with IC, even if they do not explicitly detail those qualities. However, the disadvantage to using such 
context-specific shorthand to explain the levels of the model is of course that without a general 
understanding of the theoretical framework underlying and supporting the model, it can be difficult to 
see how the model applies to a context where the examples used are not as relevant, and the model 
thus loses descriptive value and flexibility. Using bank loans and similar financial institutions as 
examples illustrating IC, for example, will only be usefully descriptive if there is a homogenous 
understanding of what such activities imply. The level of management activity that is necessary to 
invest in an intellectual value construction for it to be accepted as collateral, and the leverage 
opportunities presented by such capitalization, will be highly dependent on the society in which the 
actors accept it as collateral, and the institutions in that society for handling collateral value. This 
might seem a needless truism, in that it is obvious that the security and communicated trust inherent in 
collateral will only extend as far as the security and trust inherent in society‟s collateral institutions, 
but there are still advantages in terms of applicability and flexibility to be gained from defining 
intellectual capital on more generalized grounds. 
 
The difficulty of using the given examples to illustrate the model outside of their original context 
became clear when the model was applied to the standardization system. A patent owned by a 
standards creator can often be used as collateral for a loan, but it is not in this role that patents 
becomes most significant within the standards system, nor are many of the actors involved in shaping 
the standards system in need of securing investment funding. There is no doubt that the model, and its 
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underlying theoretical assumptions about the reality of intellectual value management, can apply to the 
activities and goals of the standards creator, but not using the examples initially employed to illustrate 
the model. If a patent owned by a standards creator is sold or collateralized, it has generally not 
achieved the level of value construction and leveraging potential that is the ultimate goal of value 
construction in the standards system. To describe this goal within the descriptive model, it was 
necessary to deconstruct the  
 
The criteria, then, for defining IC without relying entirely on specific phenomena such as bank loans, 
must be inferred from the qualities associated with such phenomena on a general level. These qualities 
include: 
 
1) validation in the eyes of actors within the relevant social and market context, 
2) the possibility of fully communicating value without challenge or misinterpretation, and 
3) even greater opportunities for value leveraging. 
 
It is easy to see to see how these qualities derive from and apply to the examples used by Petrusson to 
define IC – unquestioned validity, for example, is a key criterion in whether or not a value 
construction can be included in a bankruptcy estate, and for a value construction to be accepted as 
collateral for a loan, it must be possible to communicate its value in a way that can be uniformly 
understood by all parties. However, bringing these qualities to a generalized level also allows for the 
application of the IC-concept to activities more relevant to the standardization system. 
4.5.2 The Intellectual Value Management Model applied to the 
standardization system 
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4.5.2.1 Intellectual Assets 
 Intellectual assets are established at the earliest phase of the standardization process, in the form of 
less formal technology-based intellectual value. This value can be expressed in a number of forms, 
including fully fledged inventions, technical innovations that may lead to one or more new inventions, 
and product improvements which may or may not be dependent on existing technologies. The inherent 
value in all of these is firmly recognized by the technology-based industries that dominate standards-
collaborative efforts, but it is at the same time understood that at this stage, the intellectual value of 
these creations is difficult to communicate and extract value from. The intellectual asset management 
activity that creates, supports, and refines the value of these creations is primarily research and 
development – R&D helps the initial process of formalizing the value inherent that exists loosely as 
skill-sets and creativity in researchers, and helps structure early value creation according to principles 
of scientific rigor and, in an organization with awareness of the importance foresight, to principles of 
market success and potential IPR protection. 
4.5.2.2 Intellectual Property 
Once value in the form of intellectual assets has been defined and communicated within the company, 
the next step is to structure and protect this value in the form of intellectual property. Obtaining a 
patent usually completes the transformation of value into IP, and brings with it an immediate 
recognition of the right to that value by other actors, the ability to communicate that value, as well as 
the ability to leverage that value far more efficiently. While it is possible, for example, to sell loosely 
Figure 07. The IA-IP-IC hierarchy applied to telecommunications 
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formed technology-based value in the form of blueprints and technical descriptions, it is far more 
efficient to do so once that value has been packaged as a patent which can be easily and completely 
transferred. Another significant leveraging possibility that becomes available with the creation of a 
patent is of course licensing – by having created a structure that allows for multiple, controlled users 
of the same value, the intellectual value becomes a non-exclusive, non-conflicting resource, and 
instead of extracting value merely from use or one-time transactions, the value-extraction of the 
patented knowledge can now be extended (in theory) indefinitely).  
 
As the basis for such licensing in a standards context is inclusion in the technical specification of the 
relevant standard, the standards-specific management activities that provide the structure to enable this 
leveraging are two-fold: the submission of patent applications to the necessary authorities, and the 
submission of technical proposals to the working groups that determine the final specification of the 
standard. A value manager‟s influence over the range of technologies that are included in the standard 
will help determine the structural suitability of the standard as leveraging platform for the manager‟s 
specific IP. Failure to control the specification will not affect the IP itself negatively, but will 
drastically curtail its leveraging potential. 
4.5.2.3 Intellectual Capital 
Finally, the transformation of intellectual value within the standards system reaches its apex once 
value is transformed into intellectual capital. The prerequisite for reaching this level is the inclusion of 
the technical value in a finalized specification, and of course the preparatory undertaking of the 
appropriate IAM and IPM activities beforehand, to create the value structures that support the 
transformation into IC – in this case primarily the focused research and development activities, 
followed by the appropriate IPR applications and registrations. The difference between value at the IC 
level and the level of IP is not always immediately apparent, as there is very little perceptible 
difference between a patent that is used as IP and one that has become IC, and the process of 
transformation moves, to some extent, out of the value manager‟s hands at this point. It is no longer 
primarily a question of packaging and re-designing the value as such, but more one of establishing the 
proper interfaces for value leveraging.  
 
In accordance with the understanding of value as a function of legitimacy, this appears to be a typical 
characteristic of IC – the difference between a house that constitutes sellable real estate and one that 
constitutes collateralizable real estate is not vested in any ontological reality of the house itself, but in 
its interface to social and financial institutions. As mentioned earlier, the value manager in the 
standards system can exert a somewhat greater level of influence over the creation of such interfaces 
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than actors in most other contexts, but this control is not complete. While a participant in the relevant 
standards organizations and the various working groups can contribute proposals and act to secure his 
own rights in the proposed technology-base of the standard, the ultimate selection is still an external 
process, and performed through a combination of „beauty contest‟ principles and compromise between 
the actors. It is this technology-base that constitutes the terms on which IP can be leveraged – 
inclusion of the technical claims encompassed by a patent in the specification will mean, once 
essential patents have been declared and accepted by the actors implementing the standard, that the 
licensing potential of the patent itself will grow exponentially, as a result of technological lock-in. 
Such leveraging effects are what separate the solitary, „uninterfaced‟ patent at an IP level from the 
accepted essential patent at the IC level, where it has become accepted as part of a compliant 
implementation of a standard. 
 
When applied to the activities and processes that constitute the primary focus of the standardization 
system, it is easy to see how the model adds a descriptive dimension that maps onto the activities and 
interests of actors creating standards. With the revised conceptual background, the intellectual value 
structure of standards activities as a progressive constructive process becomes clear, and intellectual 
value creation becomes a process of engaging in intellectual value management activities in order to 
ascend from the loosely defined, poorly communicated level of intellectual assets, towards the 
formally recognized and enforced structural level of intellectual property, to the recognized, trusted, 
and leveraged level of intellectual capital. Each level of intellectual value construction increases the 
level of construction inherent in the intellectual value, and at the same time increases the level of 
exploitable value (the value return on construction investment) and adds new forms of available 
leveraging opportunities, including sales, licensing, and collateralization. 
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5. The standardization value network 
Mapping the intellectual value management activities described in the applied models to the practical 
reality of the standardization system can be done in a number of ways, in order to create an 
understanding of the system that expands on the traditional perspective of the value chain and that 
incorporates the unique structures of the standards 
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Figure 08. The standardization value network 
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5.1 Understanding the Figure 
The standardization value network focuses on describing the system of standardization-related 
processes, and on mapping the flow of value throughout this system. Simply put, the overall value 
flow throughout the system is intended to be circular – as one progresses through the system, value is 
added through various contributive processes until one reaches the market, where value flows in the 
other direction, in the form of compensation for the value-generating activities. This is of course not 
done chronologically, as it would be impossible to have the original value contributors wait until the 
finished products reached the end-customer before they receive compensation for their value-
generating activity. Ultimately, however, the dynamic of the standards system as displayed in this 
figure is one of value-generation and compensation balancing each other out (and in reality, preferably 
spiraling upwards, with greater compensation allowing for greater advances in value-generation). 
 
In the figure, processes are separated and grouped by their effects in creating value flows within the 
system, as well as their relation to the overall process of creating standards. For this reason, processes 
are grouped according to their primary role in this interplay – processes relating to standards creation, 
standards implementation, standards setting, and the normative processes that provide structures for 
the interaction of the processes. Each grouping and its related activities will be discussed in greater 
depth later on, but the overall dynamic is hopefully clear from the diagram. Standards creators 
contribute the initial value-generating activity which drives the standardization process; this value is 
collected and combined in the standards setting process, and the packaged result is implemented and 
used as a basis for value-adding activities in standards implementation processes, which then lead into 
market interaction. It is worth noting that while the terms are similar, the processes of standards 
creation and standards setting are quite different – in standards creation, the substantial value content 
of a standards is actually created, whereas in standards setting processes, the specific scope and range 
of included technologies in the standard are formally decided upon. In the figure, value flows are 
represented by blue arrows, whereas, in order to differentiate between the different effects of the 
activities, the creation and maintenance of the framework of normative structures established by 
standards organizations and legislative boundaries is represented by red arrows. 
 
5.2 Standards Creation 
 
STANDARDS CREATION
-Research and Development
  - Creates intellectual assets
  - Creates the technology-based innovation driving the    
    market
-IPR creation
  - Transforms intellectual assets into intellectual property
  - Creates the building blocks for the IP structures in 
    SSO’s
-Out-licensing
  - Leverages intellectual property
  - Diffuses technological advance
  - Creates channels for compensation flows
-Specification Proposals
  - Contributes technology-based intellectual value to 
    specifications
  - Lays foundations for IPR-supported compensation flow 
    claims
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5.2.1 Research and Development 
The initial processes in the intellectual value network originate with the standards creators. At this 
point the intellectual value creation that provides the material for a standard is funded and carried out. 
Naturally, research and development plays a large role at this stage, as this process creates the 
technology-based innovation that drives the entire telecommunications field. This research can be 
everything from faster data transfer protocols to improved radio mast transmitter or technologies for 
compressing and displaying video data in mobile terminals. Not all the research that contributes to 
advances in the end-user experience of telecommunications can be included in this process – those 
technological innovations that are implemented in mobile terminals but are not officially standardized, 
should not be viewed as part of the standards creation process. These could include lithium polymers 
for use in more efficient, longer lasting batteries, or the digital rights management used to encrypt 
proprietary data files on the terminal, neither of which is included in formal telecommunications 
standardization processes. The reason for this potential confusion is of course the convergence of 
technologies that go into the creation of a cellular phone, but this value network, and thesis, focuses on 
telecommunication innovations – not mobile entertainment innovations. 
5.2.2 IPR Creation 
In the standards creation process, both intellectual assets and intellectual capital are created. In the 
research and development process, intellectual assets are created, in the form of fundamental 
technology-based innovations. In keeping with the definition of intellectual assets, these do not, 
initially, enjoy intellectual protection, and are often difficult to define and delimit – an innovation may 
at this point take the form of a categorized research project, but it may also be a part of a project, an 
external invention disclosure, or an early suggestion in R&D brainstorming. In a functional standards-
oriented organization, however, these intellectual assets are identified at an early stage and funneled 
into the process of creating IPR protection – primarily through the application for a patent on the 
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invention. This process can be performed in different fashions depending on the organizational 
structure of the corporate actor, but takes the general form outlined in the earlier discussion of 
intellectual capital management – identifying and analyzing the assets, and complementing or 
redefining these until they meet the criteria of a „good‟ patent – a patent that encompasses the 
invention, that can be relied upon in a litigation process, and that has sufficient economic potential to 
motivate the costs of the intellectual capital management process, in the form of generating licenses or 
creating market opportunities. During the last decade of SSO regulation, standards creators have 
learned the importance of both of these processes – claiming intellectual value has become as 
important as creating intellectual value, and the consequences of allowing others the freedom to claim 
title have been clearly demonstrated.
34
 
5.2.3 Specification Proposals 
In the process of creating and claiming the value that serves as the basis for compensation flows 
within the network, the standards creator must communicate both the value of their assets as well as 
the claims that encompass those assets to other parties within the value network in order to validate 
their claims. This is primarily done through technical proposals to the relevant SSO, in which the 
technology-based intellectual value created in research and development activities is communicated 
and suggested as a potential basis for a new generation of technology in the various working groups 
and boards. The selection process these proposals are subject to is officially an examination of 
technical merit, but is of course also a result of compromise and political maneuvering. Once a 
technical proposal has been accepted into an official specification, it will be part of the groundwork 
for that technological generation of telecommunications – the technological value of the proposal is 
added to the collective value of the standard. In the current system, this contribution of value is 
recognized as grounds for compensation, and thus serves as the initial foundation in creating a 
compensation channel, yet without the support of IPR claims which help direct that channel, there is 
no guarantee that value-generating activities are properly compensated. 
5.2.4 Out-Licensing 
Once the technical solutions proposed by an actor have been made essential to a standard, and these 
have been supported by IPR claims that capture and claim title to these intellectual assets, standards 
creators can initiate the activities that provide actual monetary compensation for these activities. Out-
licensing is the final step in the establishment of compensation flow from the point of view of the 
standards creators. The activities involved in this process include ascertaining the essentiality of 
                                                     
34 Cf. the GSM licensing agreements between Motorola and Ericsson, to be discussed in a later chapter. 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
40 
proprietary IPR, through the „mapping‟ process whereby the claims protected by law are matched to 
the claims propounded by the established standard, and establishing a continually updated list of actors 
who aim to accomplish a compliant implementation of the relevant standard. These activities are to 
some extent similar to the traditional, non-standardized tactics of licensing, but reflect the leverage-
effect of standardization. Where normal licensing activities would require the licensor to map its IPR 
against the final, physical product of every potential licensee, a standards creator can map its 
theoretical claims set (its proprietary IPR) against an established theoretical claims set (the technical 
specification), and then immediately apply these results uniformly to a large number of self-declared 
implementers. These implementers are contacted and a licensing agreement is negotiated, governed to 
a large extent by the normative structures laid down by SSO policies and applicable legislation. As 
this activity is the primary source of compensation within the standardization system for those 
activities which establish the fundamental intellectual value in the system, each of these agreements is 
of great economic significance for the standards creator, and is highly dependent on a systematic and 
strategic approach to the intellectual creation and leveraging process within the standardization system. 
5.3 Standards Setting 
As explained earlier, the specification/standards 
setting activities within the system are based on the 
value claims contributed by standards creating 
actors. These contributions help turn the standards 
setting activities into a value nexus, where 
technology-based value is collected and combined 
to form a unified set of claims that will comprise the standard. This process is governed by the 
relevant SSO for the standard, and thus follows slightly different paths based on the policies of the 
organization, but the purpose is always to enable the construction of a technology-based structure 
allowing for additional value creation. This additional value creation derives, of course, from the 
benefits of a holistic telecommunications technology „generation,‟ as well as from the interoperability 
and intercompatibility assured through the interaction and collaboration between standards creators. 
Supporting and enabling these activities is the technical selection process, which in each SSO aims to 
apply criteria of technical merit to the claims proposed in the working groups and boards. The final 
quality of the resulting claims-set is an essential linchpin in the entire system, as it indirectly sets the 
basis on which all compensation within the standards system is predicated – the technical solutions 
arrived at largely determine the quality of the end product which the customer will ultimately pay for, 
initiating the compensation chain.  
STANDARDS SETTING
- Construction of technology-based structures 
  for value creation
  - Provide the primary value within the standard (the 
    technical innovation)
  - Create value-based channels for compensation
- Construction of claim-based structures for IPR 
  compensation channels
  - Create legal claims that contain the technical claims
  - Create title-based channels for compensation
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At the same time, the technical claims made to the SSO in question are interlinked with IPR-based title 
claims, whereby the standards creators not only assert that their proposed technological solution is 
superior, but also that it is proprietary. The existence of such title claims is explicitly disregarded in 
the technical selection process in an SSO
35
, but there is no doubt that they play a significant role in the 
political maneuverings that motivate corporate participation in standardization cooperation. Title 
claims officially come into the open during the declaration of essential IPR, once the specification for 
the standard has been agreed on, and the members are asked to reveal to the public which IPR-claims 
they feel that they can make that encompass one or more of the claims that are essential to the 
implementation of the specification
36
. As mentioned, this is the second part of the two-step process of 
constructing a correct compensation channel – IPR protection must be created, and linked to the 
technology-based intellectual value, in order to combine intellectual assets and property into 
intellectual capital that can be optimally leveraged. 
STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATIONSTANDARDS SETTING
TECHNOLOGICAL 
VALUE CLAIMS
IPR-BASED
TITLE CLAIMS
STANDARDS 
PROPOSAL
SSO 
LICENSING 
TERMS
License Agreement
License Agreement
License Agreement
License Agreement
Licensing Agreement
STANDARDS CREATION
 
Figure 09.  The IP structures established by standards setting activities. 
 
The IP structures generated by standards setting follow a simple model, which coincidentally models 
the development of intellectual asset, property, and capital management activities. In chronological 
order, the standards creators in the system create intellectual assets by creating technological value 
claims, and propose it for inclusion in a standard. Once accepted, the proposal is supported by 
intellectual property constructions in the declaration of essential IPR that follows the proposal. This 
combination is then used as a basis for a licensing offer which is modeled on the terms established in 
SSO policies (such as FRAND terms, for example), at which point the offer can be directed to the 
implementers of the standard. This is the final step in the development process, and turns the 
intellectual property claims into intellectual capital, by leveraging the intellectual property into a value 
                                                     
35 “Specific licensing terms and negotiations are commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed within ETSI. 
Technical Bodies are not the appropriate place to discuss IPR Issues. Technical Bodies do not have the competence to deal with commercial 
issues. Members attending ETSI Technical Bodies are often technical experts who do not have legal or business responsibilities with regard 
to licensing issues. Discussion on licensing issues among competitors in a standards making process can significantly complicate, delay or 
derail this process.” – ETSI Directives, December 2005 
36 The definition of essentiality will be discussed at a later point in this thesis. 
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construction that is fully validated by the market, undeniable in its financial implications, and fully 
realized as a compensation flow channel. 
5.4 Normative Structures 
The primary role of the normative structures, both 
regulatory and legislative, is to provide boundaries 
on the behavior of actors in the system. These are 
the „rules of game‟ which not only limit the 
alternatives open to actors in the system, but also 
provide the very means by which the system is kept 
running – unified, reliable normative boundaries 
are after all the prerequisite for all formalized 
human interaction. Within standardization 
collaboration these boundaries take two forms – 
regulatory normative structures, which derive from the policies and terms by which members of SSO‟s 
are bound, and legislative normative structures, which derive from national, regional, and international 
laws and treaties. The former are created by the actors themselves, but are formalized through the 
application of voting procedure and administrative procedures within the organizations. The latter are 
bound to national and regional interests of economic control, represent the democratically expressed 
will of the people in the affected nations or regions, and are of course not always entirely specific to 
SSO members. Together, they provide a normative framework within which the processes of the 
standardization system exist. 
5.4.1 Competition Law 
The legislative structures of competition law provide restrictions on the possibilities for market 
consolidation, and on technology transfer possibilities – both by strictly constraining the available 
actions of dominant market actors, and by prohibiting such arrangements that would distort natural 
competition. In the standardization system, these laws are often particularly significant, as the basis of 
voluntary cooperation between actors on the market upon which standards rest is a fundamental 
divergence from typical market interaction. In order not to risk violating these prohibitions, the SSO‟s 
must take care not to take too active of a role when dictating member behavior through policy 
guidelines. Even then, there are potential conflicts between the principles of competition law and the 
structure of SSO cooperation – phenomena such as „lock-in‟ and „hold-up‟ licensing, which will be 
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATIVE 
NORMATIVE STRUCTURES
-Competition Law
  - Regulates market consolidation and technology transfer 
    opportunities
-Contractual Law
  - Provides structures for actor interaction and the basis 
    for standards obligations
-Consumer Protection Legislation & Spectrum Allocation
  - Limits the available scope of technology-based value 
    innovation
-National & International SSO’s
  - Create IP compensation structures
  - Funnel compensation flows (leverage poss. Of both IPR 
    and tech)
  - Create technological cooperation enabling interop.
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discussed later on in this thesis, have lead certain actors on the market to claim that current SSO 
structures facilitate competition law violations by members. 
 
At the same time, members themselves are directly subject to competition law in their more 
independent behavior. There is a clear risk of competition law violations both in the extensive 
negotiations which precede the setting of a standard, as an unfettered exchange of plans and 
technological progress can easily be seen as a cartel arrangement under certain circumstances, and in 
the license agreements negotiated by the members themselves, after the standard has been set. These 
agreements are the unstated economic goal of most SSO participants, but are only partly influenced by 
the SSO‟s themselves – while many SSO policies establish certain generalized terms for licensing, the 
SSO‟s themselves take no active role in establishing the agreements, nor do they take it upon 
themselves to examine the licenses for compliance with SSO policy.. For this reason, it is incumbent 
on the members themselves to ensure that competition law is not violated in these agreements, which 
can often be a danger when extensive cross-licensing deals are negotiated – if the relevant 
technological market is found to be unnaturally distorted by the cross-licensing arrangements, this can 
be as significant of an infraction as conventional price-fixing agreements.‟ 
5.4.2 Other Legislation 
Many other forms of legislation regulate the behavior of the actors in the standards system – consumer 
protection legislation, for example, sets certain limitations on the end-products of standardization that 
ultimately reach the customer – both regulation regarding sales tactics, when standards implementers 
interact with the market, but also on the available technical innovative space, including limits, for 
example, on permissible RF radiation levels
37
. These forms of normative structures exist in every 
value system however, and are not particularly unique in their application to standards cooperation. It 
is worth noting, however, that the normative structures which support, rather than constrain, the 
central sphere of standardization cooperation – the actual standards setting – consist of little more than 
conventional contractual law. On the legislative arena, contractual liability is among the weaker forms 
of normative structure, and when this is combined with the often vague statements of mutual intent 
that underlie standards participation, a distinct lack of both predictability and enforceability arises. 
5.5 Standards Implementation 
 
 
                                                     
37 Cf. The FCC Telecommunications Act of 1996 (US) 
STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATION
-In-licensing
  - Completes channels for compensation flow
  - Validates intellectual property
  - Adds value to standards by exponentiating
    interoperability
-Value-addition
  - Leverages value
  - Brings technology-based value to the market; creates 
    compensation sources
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5.5.1 In-licensing 
In-licensing activities are the conduit between the value-generating activities of standards creators and 
the compensation activities undertaken in market interaction. Through in-licensing the technological 
value created in standards creation processes such as R&D and packaged in standards setting 
processes are transferred to standards implementers, and, as long as technological value has been 
appropriately encompassed by IPR claims, the standards implementer completes the compensation 
flow channel, leading from market interaction all the way back to technological value generation 
activities. This can be viewed either as an obligation on the part of the implementers, as they are 
obliged to engage in sometimes costly in-licensing in order to achieve a compliant implementation of 
the standard, or as a straightforward purchasing decision, but the effect is still one of gaining access to 
technological value in order to be able to add secondary value and present market offerings for 
compensation. It is worth noting that licensing activities are rarely, if ever, as simplified as described 
here – while the formal, open standardization system builds on the tenet that homogenized licensing 
terms are offered without discrimination to all implementers, these terms in no way deal 
comprehensively with the factors that must be regulated in a licensing arrangement. 
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6. The value chain 
In this section the value chain for the telecommunication sector and the actors included in it will be 
presented. The objective is to present the different values created through the chain including societal 
values, principal values, and technology progress values with the interests of SSO’s in mind. The 
choice of values considered as relevant in this case will limit the choice of relevant actors included in 
the value chain. 
 
Furthermore, eventual non-commercial actors that can be relevant in the value creation phase will be 
presented. To demonstrate the different interests involved in the different parts of the value chain there 
will be a set of different value flows presented. The main goal for all actors in the production/value 
chain is to optimize their own winnings disregarding how this would affect the other actors in the 
chain. 
 
A company‟s value chain is a mean to analyze a company by looking at its environment; identifying 
all actors involved and determining the connection between them. A value chain can be used as a tool 
to show all money flows and understanding the position and thus control of a specific actor. In order to 
do a complete value chain one has to use a tool for analyzing the environment the company is active 
within. In this thesis Porter‟s Five Forces are used for that purpose. 
6.1 Applied Porter’s Five forces 
In this text that follows the telecommunication industry from (1) a major IP-holder and (2) an 
operator‟s perspective will be analyzed with Porter‟s five forces in mind. The Chapter is divided into 
the three actors mentioned earlier and the five parts that the model consists of; degree of rivalry, 
supplier power, threats of substitutes, buyer power and barriers to entry.   
6.1.1 The IP-holder 
Major IP-holders in the telecommunication industry are both system, hardware and software producers 
such as Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia and Qualcomm. Their role of the system providers is to provide 
with the Backbone network. A transport provider provides with the connection to the part that is not 
closest to the customer and connects to the backbone network. The connection and cable that is closest 
to the customer is provided by the access network provider. Within the telecommunication industry 
there are large IP-holders with rights for technologies essential for the function of the terminals. How 
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are they connected to the other actors of the telecommunication value chain and how do they come in 
contact with the end-users? 
6.1.1.1 Degree of Rivalry 
The degree of competition on a market will depend on different parameters, such as number of 
companies, market growth, product differentiation and switching costs, to name some. In the 
telecommunication industry there are not that many system providers. The ones controlling the 
backbone system are few and often own the essential patents and rights for technologies behind this 
telecommunication system. The market growth is stable and the market shares are gained by buying or 
licensing parts of the existing network. When there is no existing network the different companies will 
have to buy the option to develop a network from the government, where price is one of the decisive 
factors. Switching costs for operators to change network provider are big and in some cases it is 
impossible to change since there is only one actor. 
6.1.1.2 Supplier Power 
If suppliers are powerful they can have severe influence on the industry and capture a large share of 
the profit generated. In the case of the system or hardware providers the suppliers are usually the 
actors themselves as the production is one part of the actor‟s activities.  
6.1.1.3 Threats of Substitutes 
Porter refers to substitutes as new products or technologies sometimes in other industries that can 
become a base for competing value propositions in the market. They can be considered a threat when a 
product‟s demand is affected by the price change of a substituting product. As the telecommunication 
industry is connected to the standardization work, where the dominant technologies are decided for the 
biggest markets in the world, the treat for substitutes is the standard selected by the majority of the 
actors within the telecommunication chain if different from ones own technology. If an actor has a 
technology that is an alternative to the standard, it will have a hard time to enter the market depending 
on how many supporters it has and their role and influence on the market. There are many widely 
accepted technologies outside the standards but they are usually complements and depend on the 
standards.  
6.1.1.4 Buyer Power 
The buyers in this case are the different operators such as Vodafone, 3 and Telia that purchase or pay 
for the right to use some parts of the network as well as the devices for enabling communication and 
are the physical product they in their turn sell to their customers and end-users. As there are not that 
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many network providers even if the product is standardized they are forced to buy from the actors 
available. When it comes to the terminals, there are many producers but the operators often choose to 
buy from almost all manufacturers to sell as many physical products as possible to gain money from 
the services they will provide with the physical product.  
6.1.1.5 Barriers to Entry 
It is not only internal competition in the market that poses a threat to businesses, there is always a risk 
that new companies enter the market and affect competition, however small. The telecommunication 
industry possesses characteristics that protect high profit levels of companies already in the market and 
prevent additional competitors from entering. These characteristics are called barriers to entry and 
uniquely define the market. Barriers reduce the rate of entry of new companies and thus maintain a 
level of profits for those already in the market. From a strategic perspective barriers can be created or 
exploited to enhance a company‟s competitive advantage. Barriers to entry may arise from several 
sources; government, IPR, asset specificity, economies of scale.  
 
Government creates the framework for how companies can compete in a market. Even though the 
principal role of the government is to preserve competition, they also restrict competition by granting 
monopolies and through regulation. This makes barriers to rise and must be considered when entering 
a market. Companies already in the market may actively use various IPR´s to protect knowledge and 
build competitive advantage. This prevents others from using the knowledge and thus creates a barrier 
to entry if the knowledge is needed for competing in the market, which is how the telecommunication 
industry works. 
6.1.2 The operators 
The operators are actors that package, distribute and pay for the telecommunication service. In some 
cases the operator will not own their own network, which means that they would have to pay a 
network operator for that service. Operators are in a traditional value chain vertically integrated with 
network operators and the content providers. Examples on operators are Vodafone, Telia, 3, Orange 
etc.  
6.1.2.1 Supplier Power 
The suppliers in this case are the network operators as well as hardware and software producers. When 
it comes to technology the solutions are often standardized and the only thing that diversifies them is 
the design and features of the physical products they sell to their customers. Since operators will buy 
almost from all major producers to satisfy a larger group of people, one can say that the suppliers are 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
48 
many and diversified, however when it comes to the network suppliers the supply is not that big and in 
some cases there can be only one actor for a specific area. Thus the network suppliers have therefore 
more power over the operators than the hardware and software producers have. 
6.1.2.2 Degree of Rivalry 
There are a lot of operators on the market and the competition for the market shares is fierce. The 
operators have to diversify their offers by using price and special combinations to attract customers. 
The market growth is increasing while new means for communicating are created. There are some 
dominant actors on the local market in the different countries but there is no dominant global operator, 
which makes the diversification of the operators even more apparent. The switching cost for changing 
an operator are not big at all, which explains the fact that the customers are not loyal and always 
looking for the best offer.  
6.1.2.3 Threats of Substitutes 
The telecommunication industry is an industry under constant change. New technologies and ways to 
communicate appear all the time leaving actors not prepared for the changes behind. It is very easy to 
develop a company within its traditional frames, however times like these call for more flexibility 
from the actors and their business definitions. Voice over IP has existed for some time and can be 
considered as a substitute to the traditional communication by phone. Even though there is no 
substitute that is able to outmaneuver the traditional wireless communication by cellular phone, the 
substitute market is emerging and a lot of money and investments are done for developing the next 
best thing that is going to enable communication cheaper and with no restrictions for the end-user.  
6.1.2.4 Buyers Power 
By defining the market need or the market pull one can detect if there is a situation where the 
company is given the opportunity/possibility to extent its economic marginal. In this situation the 
switching cost is what determines which technology will be widely adopted. The number of buyers in 
a market and the power they possess dictates under which conditions the companies can offer their 
value propositions. Since the products offered to the customers are in a sense standardized the buyers 
are considered as powerful. The buyers are fragmented and buy the services and products from the 
operator with the best offers. Switching costs are low and the buyers on the market are able to 
influence changes to their benefit.  
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6.1.2.5 Barriers to Entry 
It does not seem to be difficult for new operators to enter the market. Since they do not have to have 
the technical expertise and are merely a link between the end-users and the mobile manufactures by 
providing services, besides when they actually maintain and own a part of the network and thus 
provide access to the net. The only obstacle operators have to face is the numerous agreements they 
have to sign with licensors for the technology and the owners of the network that could be the 
government. Since Sweden dropped their telecommunication monopoly with Telia it has become easy 
for other operators to enter the market and create a competitive environment, where everyone has the 
same opportunities to succeed and the same threats to fail. Since everything nowadays is global 
competition gets more fierce and operators have to win their customers loyalty to continue existing.  
6.2 The Telecommunications Value Chain 
In this chapter an intellectual value chain as applied to the telecommunications standardization system 
is presented. One could say that the chain more resembles a network structure, but since the 
standardization industry does not follow a chain structure per definition this network way of depicting 
the different flows was found necessary. However it is still a value chain in the end. The figure 
presented in this chapter is a schematic way of presenting the different actors and how they are 
connected to each other. Unfortunately in reality the value chain is more complicated since many 
actors can have different roles at different times as well as have more than one role at the same way. 
Thus the intellectual value chain in this chapter is of a simplified manner. 
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Figure 10.  The Telecommunications industry’s value chain 
 
As seen in Figure YY there are many actors that are involved in the telecommunication process to 
enable communication between entities. As mentioned earlier, in reality the value chain would appear 
more complex with more actors involved that have more than one role in different chains. Thus the 
chain presented in figure YY gives a simplified picture of reality where the most important roles are 
reflected as well as the most usual flows displayed. Now follows a short description of the key actors 
as seen in the value chain. 
 
Backbone Provider – A backbone provider is a system provider. They provide their customers with the 
base stations, infrastructure, transmitters, etc and handle the installations involved when setting up the 
backbone structure to enable communication between physical entities. It is really important that 
structures like these are standardized in order to serve as many customers all over the world. If this 
was not plausible then each type of terminal would have its own infrastructure system, which would 
make the overall communication more difficult, expensive and dysfunctional.  
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They usually posses the technology behind the systems and are in some cases responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of them. The owner structure of such structures differs, in some cases 
the backbone providers are only important IP-holders and in other cases they will own and run the 
systems by themselves. In other words a Backbone provider can be an Assess Network Provider, an 
Access Service Provide and an Access Application Provider in the same time.  
 
Access Network Provider – The Access Network Provider is the actor responsible for providing the 
access network. This actor will manage the network equipment parts to enable communication for 
authorized customers by allowing them to transfer and process information via the network. The 
Access Network Provider may provide services to end customers or just manage the network 
equipment so that another company can provide the actual services to customers. These services do 
not always have to be hardware related but can be provided through a virtual way.  In other words 
while the Backbone Provider will provide with the infrastructure needed, the Access Network Provider 
will be the link between the Backbone Providers and the actual customer. Because of the two roles 
being so close to each other some actors will have both roles to gain better control over the network.  
 
Access Service Provider – An Access Service Provider will as the name implies provide the end-user 
with access to the access provided network. The Access Service Provider will pay the Access Network 
Provider for the access that they will then offer to the end-user with additional services. In other words 
a carrier or service provider is company that is engaged in transferring electrical signals or messages 
for hire through one or more telecommunications systems. These actors are the ones that are closest to 
the end-user and are thus more influential than others. Being close to the customers and having this 
close relationship enables these actors to gain a structural control that the other actors in the value 
chain are not able to gain because of their non direct relation to the end-users. In few words the 
customers will almost only acknowledge the work of the actors closest to them.   
 
Operator – An operator provides with mobile telecommunication services including data and voice 
communication. They buy terminals form a terminal producer and while the carrier will appear as 
being for free for the end-user, the operators charge their customers for the services connected to the 
terminal. They are the actors with the most contact with the end-users competing with the range of 
services and prices wit the other competitors on the market. Therefore are they considered of the most 
influential actors in the value chain; the end-users are aware of the operators and thus brand 
recognition occurs. The Access Network Providers, Access Service Providers and Application Service 
Providers can be examples of Operators. The Operators are to be seen as a more general concept that 
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involves more roles and can be in some cases separated from i.e. Access Service Providers. Examples 
of such companies are Vodafone, Telia, Comviq etc.  
 
Component Provider – A Component Provider is an independent producer and provider of parts or 
technology that operators and terminal producers supply from. They are actors “outside” the system 
and have a material connection to their customers in the telecommunication‟s value chain. They are 
often not a part of the standards and act as an outside-in actor. They may have strong IP structures 
when it comes to protecting their technology. Since they are not a part of the standards they are not 
obliged to follow the FRAND rules when it comes to licensing agreements with their customers. In 
some cases they will act only as providers where they get paid fro the components they sell. In either 
way are these actors outside the standards system which can either mean that they are able to exploit 
their technology and gain more money than they would do if being part of the standards, or their 
technology is not part of the standards and thus not that widely used. There is a gray zone in-between 
those two scenarios where the actors will actually produce components according to standardization 
procedures in which way they will have to pay fees to the IP-holders to produce these components.  
 
Independent Vendor – An Independent Vendor is an internet based or physical store that sell terminal 
with or without a subscription connected to an operator. They buy the terminals and “packages” from 
the operators and terminal producers. Examples of such vendors are PhoneHouse, SIBA, etc. They 
have no influence over the products or services they sell and are a part of the traditional material chain 
where they function as retailers. They have no IP-control and are not a part of the standards system. 
 
Payment Provider – The Payment Providers seldom have an independent role in the 
telecommunication value chain, as opposed to being a key actor when it comes to e-commerce. 
However, having someone that is responsible for the payment scheme is important concerning that a 
lot of the services can be provided in a virtual way. This role is often taken care of the operators.  
 
Independent Service Provider – Actors that provide with information, educational or entertainment 
content for software based products, such as mobile phones. A content provider may in some cases 
provide the customer with software to access the services. They are not standards creators since they 
are outside the standards sphere, but they are standards implementers and they create services 
according to the standards to satisfy the end-users needs. In some cases these Service Providers can be 
part of an operator‟s structure, but then they would not be independent. 
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Terminal Producer – In some cases the provider for the hardware will also provide with the software 
solutions included, or vise versa. In the telecommunication industry it is common that the software 
developers include their solutions in hardware carriers to obtain better protection for their innovations. 
They are the ones providing with the carriers that operators buy to package with their services that 
they get paid for providing after selling an entity. However, there are many actors that are Terminal 
Producers but have different job descriptions. For example Sony Ericsson does not create IP on their 
own but are one of the main terminal providers as a result of a venture between Sony and Ericsson.  
Another example is Nokia that works a lot with R&D and creates IP while selling terminals, etc. 
 
The end-user - As seen in the figure the end-user will have the most established relationship with the 
Content Provider and the Operators. Through their relationship with the Content Provider and 
Operators, the end-user will be able to receive more customer-made services and applications. They 
are in a sense the driving force for change and even if they do not influence the standards in a direct 
way, it is the end-users the actors develop standards to please.  The end-user or subscriber is the one 
demanding different services and is offered a clump sum with often no regard to the different money 
flows and structures within the telecommunication value scheme. In a way the end-users are unaware 
of the structures and business relationships that are enable telecommunication; in a way they do not 
always know what they pay for. Their concern is to close the best deal that fulfills their individual 
demands and the rest is supposed to work of itself. That is way Operators and Content Providers that 
have the closest relationship to the end-users are the ones that set the grounds for what the users are 
willing to pay. 
6.3 Structural control 
The government, standard organizations, the open source movement and in some extent the individual 
actor monitor and regulate the actors of the value chain through rules and legislations. Structural 
control is gained by having an understanding of intellectual resources that enables structural 
exploitation and leveraging. There are five main areas the actors on the market should specifically 
attend to; technology control, intellectual property rights, market power, secrecy and licensing 
contracts.  
 
Technology control – The telecommunication industry is defined by the level of standardization 
participation. Actors involved in the standardization processes can influence the technology adoption 
on the market by being able to help in deciding which technologies will be incorporated in standards. 
In this way the different actors have the power to push for their own developed technology to increase 
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their profits through sales and licensing agreements. The standard procedure is that companies will 
become alias and by gaining the majority of the votes establish the technologies that they want.  
 
Intellectual Property Rights – Protecting ones property by knowing the intellectual rights of the 
technology one owns is very powerful. By gaining fully intellectual property rights the technology is 
easier protected and it becomes easier for the actor to extract value and protect their innovations from 
infringements. Intellectual Property Rights comes in many shapes, where the most usual are; patents, 
copyrights, trade marks, trade secrets and design rights. Not all of the intellectual Property Rights have 
to be applied for in order to have, some are automatically generated while coming up with new 
innovations. In the standards arena it is very important to have the rights of the technology 
incorporated in standards since this is what will guarantee one a large future income through licenses 
and sales. In other words for someone to extract value that does not manufacture and gain revenues 
trough material sales, the intellectual property rights are of an essence to guarantee survival and wealth 
for the company. In the intellectualized economy having rights and strategies and structures to support 
them is the key essence for obtaining competitive advantages and control.  
 
Market Power – Market power is among others recognition, which is a way of evaluating ones brand 
on the market. A company gains market power when there are known and diffused within their 
business field and the customers trust and acknowledge the brand and all that it stands for. In other 
words one can say that how popular you are is quantitatively seen through the market shares a 
company has, thus it has to do with the level of company rivalry. Ericsson is one of the largest players 
on the market when it comes to backbone systems enabling wireless communication. They are also 
one of the largest players when it comes to mobile technology and solutions for the internet. Since 
they are active in many countries all over the world an exact percentage of their market share is hard 
to determine. 
 
Secrecy – This can be a big part of obtaining structural control for some actors. It involves trade 
secrets and how well they are kept and how much value it creates for them. Companies have to have 
structures and strategies for making sure that information that can be sensitive for the company and 
should not be known outside the company should stay inside it and thus create value. In a way one can 
say that it has to do with preventing industrial espionage. Technology intensive companies have their 
future existence riding on keeping developing technology a secret in order to later on obtain full rights 
on. On the other hand there are examples of companies such as Coca Cola that have large parts of their 
business lying within keeping their secrete receipt secrete.  
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Licensing Contracts – Licensing contracts are a big part of the legal structure of a firm when it comes 
to extracting value from the innovations. How well a contract is formulated can have a big impact in 
how much or little a company will be able to extract from its licensees. Depending on parameters such 
as time span, scope and geographical limitations can make or break a business. It is important that the 
licensor thinks about maximizing the potential of the contract by enabling to license to many actors 
while eliminating competition in the same firm. Within the standardization organization a company is 
obligated to license with FRAND (Fare, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory) terms for all actors 
involved in the organization. However, since the FRAND terms are not as explicit as one could think 
and thus the actors can formulate the contract as they wish but within reasonable terms that no one 
knows what that in practice means.  
 
For a company to gain structural control it has to be a leader in all three main arenas; Business, 
Juridical and Administrational. If a company regards the five structural control areas as mentioned 
above, they will be in a good way of dominating the market. Another thing that is of importance when 
it comes to structural control is how close one is to the end user. The level of influence and contact 
with the end user can mean tremendous implications for the company. A company that is near the end-
user is near the source its demands are tried to be met and sometimes more than that. The key is to 
identify what the customers want, why and try to meet those demands and even the demands not 
already recognized by the users themselves.  
 
Every company has a number of stakeholders that are interested in how the company is performing. 
These stakeholders can be divided into two groups depending on their influence on the decision-
making process in the business. Management, employees and a greater part of the shareholders have a 
large influence on the company and are therefore named internal stakeholders
38
. The external 
stakeholders are left out of the decision-making process but have some influence on the company 
through their interest in the organizations performance and behavior.  
 
Most of the external stakeholders are connected to the company through a contract
39
. Suppliers, 
creditors, customers and the society are some examples of stakeholders that have such a contractual 
relationship to the company. They are promised a predetermined return and they are facing the risk 
that the company can not fulfill the terms of their contract. The residual stakeholders are concerned if 
companies‟ revenues are lower than expected but some stakeholders care if they are both lower and 
                                                     
38 Hamberg 2003 
39 ibid 
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higher than expected. Shareholders invest money in the company and expect a positive return from 
venturing their money. Some shareholders have a greater influence on the businesses‟ decision-
making processes and are a part of the internal stakeholders. They have like managers an interest in 
how well the company performs. On the other hand the end-users are in a way a company‟s most 
important stakeholder. They do not however have a contractual nor residual relationship in that sense 
that they do not invest money in the company to gain revenues. End-users do invest money in the 
products and services but their value extraction is made in terms of utility satisfaction. The 
telecommunication chain is more of a network there are several customers and as known the broader 
the network becomes the more value can be extracted from the end-users. It is therefore important to 
identify the end-users utility
40
; Hardware, Services and the Access.  
                                                     
40 Sven Lindmark (presentation) TEA 
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7. Essential IPR 
A crucial step in the process of establishing the scope of a standard is the determination of essential 
patents. During the declaration of essential patents, the technical claims agreed on in a specification 
are mapped by SSO members onto their existing proprietary IPR portfolios, and those patents that 
cover these claims are declared to be „essential‟ to the standard. This process is necessary to proceed 
from the theoretical technical framework of the specification setting process to a legal and 
commercially sound structure within which the terms and means of usage of intellectual assets are 
determined. Naturally it should be assumed that the actors wishing to create exploitable value when 
participating in the standards setting process will not only map passively against declared 
specifications, but will actively work to include their IPR-protected technologies in the standard as 
such. 
 
The consequences of possessing IPR that can be designated as „essential‟ to a standard are clear and 
provide perhaps the greatest incentive for strategic participation in standards work in the first place. 
While the solutions submitted to standards groups are to be judged on their technical merit alone, the 
effects on an IPR that becomes essential are primarily commercial. Notwithstanding the lack of 
absolute certainty in defining essentiality, the theoretical result of possessing essential IPR will 
naturally be the opportunity to craft license arrangements with every actor who is planning a 
compliant implementation of the standard (in practice, of course, the inter-relationships between such 
actors makes it impossible to create license arrangements with every actor). Naturally each license will 
be still be negotiated individually, at a certain cost to the licensor, but holding IPR´s that can be relied 
upon to be considered essential gives the licensor a prepared list of potential licensees (lowering the 
cost of external intelligence gathering) in the form of standards implementers, as well as a very strong 
bargaining chip in license negotiations. 
7.1 The definition of essential patents 
Even though this process is naturally a fundamental prerequisite for the creation of a standard, very 
few SSO‟s have established a formal definition of the concept of essentiality, and the boundaries of 
the term are largely left to the decisions of the members. Worth noting is that any lack of clarity in the 
definition of essentiality is not a result of accidental sloppiness on the part of the SSO‟s, but rather 
usually an intentional part of the policy of most SSO‟s to refuse to act as arbiters of licensing matters 
between members or other parties. 
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The two most typical, informal ways of determining whether or not a patent is essential to a standard, 
tend to take the form of a positive and a negative model definition. The positive definition of an 
essential IPR usually delves no further than stating that it comprises “any IPR´s which [Members] 
believe to be essential, or potentially essential, to any work ongoing within [the SSO],”41 which 
creates a somewhat circular definition of the term. This form of definition is anchored in the technical 
paradigm of the specification, and assumes that the real-world implementation of the specified 
technologies will make it immediately obvious which patents cover technical solutions for which there 
are no substitutes – a perspective that is as optimistic as it is unrealistic. Looking at the usage and 
context of such positive definitions shows why this lack of clarity and realism arises – essential IPR´s 
are confused and conflated with the intellectual assets they serve to protect, as in this excerpt from a 
paper on the problems faced in the standardization of GSM technologies: “Essential IPR´s are defined 
as protected knowledge that is indispensable for a product that has to comply with that standard.”42. 
Naturally the IPR´s as such will never be indispensable for the product; more accurately expressed, 
essential IPR´s would be those that present insurmountable or non-circumventable obstacles. 
 
The negative definition of essentiality takes a slightly more nuanced approach, and typically defines 
essential IPR´s as meaning “that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking 
into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time of 
standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT or 
METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR”43. The difference is 
subtle, but instead of including all IPR claims that can be seen as fundamental to the specification, this 
definition explicitly only includes the minimum of IPR claims that would unavoidably be infringed by 
implementation. It may seem counterproductive to view IPR´s as obstacles to, rather than building 
blocks of, the standard, yet this definition at the very least implicitly acknowledges the need to 
minimize the quantity of licenses necessary for a  compliant implementation of the standard. As will 
be demonstrated in this thesis, this goal is one that is increasingly necessary to strive for in modern 
telecommunications standards. 
 
However, neither of these definitions achieve the level of clarity and unambiguity necessary to provide 
a reliable basis for predicting and strategically responding to standards setting. The first form of 
definition leaves the actual task of defining essentiality to the usually conflicting interests of standards 
                                                     
41 3GPP Working Procedures, 21 April 2006  
42 Bekkers et al 
43 ETSI IPR Policy, Extracted from the ETSI Rules of Procedure, 23 November 2005  
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setters and standards implementers, with the first attempting to paint the definition of essentiality as 
broadly as possible and the latter trying to limit it in equal measure. While it might seem clear to a 
technical expert in the field what constitutes an essential solution and what doesn‟t, it is nevertheless 
the case that no objective criteria are established by this form of definition. The negative definition, on 
the other hand, establishes at least one criterion for essentiality (infringement), but this too is 
unreliable in practice. Non-infringement is a legal criterion, based on the decisions of courts and 
national patent systems, and can therefore only be determined with certainty post factum. While it is 
the ambition of most national legal systems to maintain a patent system that is transparent and 
foreseeable by individuals, it is already obvious that there are wide disparities, not only between 
different patent systems, but between the applications of such rules within a single system (cf. the 
patenting of software innovations within the European Union). For this reason, this criterion of the 
essentiality definition can often only be determined to be fulfilled after a lengthy process of 
determination, which far exceeds what most actors what consider an acceptable delay in their time to 
market. The result of this lack of clarity regarding the parameters of essentiality is a state of legal 
uncertainty, which no doubt contributes to the current problems perceived in the standards system. 
 
One example of the conflicting perceptions of essentiality can be found in a study performed by PA 
Consulting, which used its own technical definition of essentiality to assess the number of declared 
essential patents in the UTRA-FDD
44
 standard and determine whether these met the criteria 
established by PA Consulting for essentiality. The results of the study showed that only approximately 
ten percent of the patents declared as essential were in reality essential to implementing the standard. 
Since the criteria the study used did not extend to a full legal-infringement analysis, the study cannot 
be said to have objectively determined the „true‟ essentiality of the patents, but the significance of the 
study lies in the extent to which actor-perception of essentiality can diverge from that of the overt 
declarations. In a system where, as will be discussed, a large amount of stability rests on the 
perception of „fairness‟ the consequences of a definition that leaves room for such divergence can pose 
a definite risk. 
  
                                                     
44 UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) Terrestrial Radio Access - Frequency Division Duplexing 
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7.2 The Consequences of an Inadequate Definition of 
Essentiality 
The inadequacy of current definitions of essentiality has been a feature of the standardization system 
throughout its history,
45
 without preventing the existence and relatively uncontested recognition of the 
rights of essential IPR-holders. However, the inherent inadequacy, springing largely from a lack of 
willingness or ability to more closely define the concept, is by now clearly engendering consequences 
that are detrimental to the entire standardization system. It is widely recognized that a large factor in 
the problems that characterize the current telecommunications standardization landscape is the 
proliferation of „essential‟ IPR claims – for each telecommunications generation that emerges, the 
number of IPR´s that must be licensed in order to achieve a compliant implementation grows steadily. 
For example, by comparing the number of patents owned that have been declared as essential to the 
WCDMA or CDMA2000 standards with those that were declared as essential to the GSM standard, a 
definite increase in the number of declarations can be perceived
46
.  
 
This is not only due to a more active and strategically aware patenting policy on the part of the major 
IPR-holders, but also, in part, to a definition of essentiality that can be exploited and expanded to at 
least give a modicum of support to license demands for an ever growing number of patents. In the long 
term, it is obvious that this will lead to a dilution of the essentiality concept, since as more patents that 
are declared essential, actors lose their assurance that a court of law would uphold the declaration, i.e. 
would maintain that implementation of the standard is necessarily an infringement of the patent in 
question. Essentiality declaration in such a climate does little to achieve the intended effect of 
reducing transaction costs, and actors will have to evaluate each license negotiation without being able 
to count on the patent actually being a necessity. At the same time, the risk of submarine patenting and 
hold-up licensing becomes an ever present danger in such an unpredictable climate. 
 
A more stringent definition of essentiality would never be able to completely and preemptively 
determine which patents will be essential to a standard, but would at least help curb the unchecked 
expansion of claims of essentiality. Such a definition would also be a useful tool to create a framework 
for objectively challenging such claims in court, allowing the regional court systems to shoulder the 
burden otherwise presented to the typically unwilling SSO administrations. It would also allow actors 
to design their contributions to a standard in a more strategically aware fashion, as the use of 
                                                     
45 In the 1980‟s there were already calls in numerous SSO‟s to include commercial essentiality in the definition of essential patents – see 
Wilkinson, S. L. (1991).  
46 3g cellular standards and patents, IEEE WirelessCom 2005, June 13, 2005. Goodman and Myers 
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„implementation patents‟ skirting the edges of essentiality would then become more precisely defined 
and relevant in the creation of patent portfolio structures. 
7.3 De Facto essentiality 
Despite the importance of the essentiality criterion in establishing an IPR-based standard, and the 
scope of the mechanisms which have evolved to enable such designations and declarations, proprietary 
IPR that is still essential to the compliant implementation can arise outside of these mechanism -  a de 
facto essentiality as opposed to a de jure essentiality. Sometimes this disparity is the result of 
undeclared IPR-ownership, or undeclared IPR applications, and this eventuality will be dealt with in 
the section on submarine patents, yet there are also other situations that can create de facto essentiality. 
7.4 Commercial Essentiality 
Commercial essentiality can be used to describe the situation where certain technical solutions, while 
not, theoretically, essential to the technical implementation of a specification, constitute the only 
viable commercial alternative(“Practicality” is generally judged by whether it would be cost-effective 
or sensible in the real world to design around the intellectual property at issue. If not, the intellectual 
property is commercially essential.”).47 As the selection process for inclusion in a specification is 
usually explicitly and self-consciously limited to technical argumentation, no consideration is made of 
the cost of implementation, or the future market structures.
48
 The consequences may well be that while 
a number of alternative solutions are seen as equally necessary to achieve a compliant implementation 
of the standard, most of them may be too expensive, or subject to limited supply. Such situations also 
arise when a marketable product relies on more than one technical solution, some of which may lie 
outside the field of standardization. The result, in such a situation, is that a product cannot be useful to 
the customer (and thus commercially viable) without a license to use the complementary technology, 
and the complementary technology then becomes commercially essential. 
 
Typically a number of factors mitigate this risk: it is unlikely that a suggestion that cannot be offered 
to the market at a competitive price will be promoted in the process of setting the specification (as 
commercial interests ultimately drive the presentation of technical proposals), and the actors that play 
significant roles in the specification setting process tend to have the necessary resources and 
                                                     
47  “Practicality” is generally judged by whether it would be cost-effective or sensible in the real world to design 
around the intellectual property at issue. If not, the intellectual property is commercially essential.” Beeney et al 2002 
48 Some definitions of essentiality allow for greater leeway, cf. the 6C DVD Pool: “A Licensor's patent is "essential," and thus subject to the 
commitments in the MOU, if it is "necessarily infringed," or "there is no realistic alternative" to it, "in implementing the DVD Standard 
Specifications." - 3C Letter, supra, n. 1 Letter from the Hon. Joel I. Klein to Carey R. Ramos (June 10, 1999) 
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infrastructure to successfully follow up their suggestions in the marketplace. In addition, it is rare that 
a product solution that encompasses several technological solutions is not entirely encompassed by the 
scope of standardization efforts within the industry. However, as the specification setting process 
usually precedes the market entry of a solution by several years, these factors cannot always be 
predicted, and new developments can lead to a de facto commercial essentiality, where it is certainly 
technically possible to achieve a compliant implementation of the standard without access to certain 
IPR, but commercially unfeasible. 
 
Even though very few standards organizations have made provisions for cases of commercial 
essentiality, the reality of these cases has been recognized by the actors on the market explicitly. For 
example, the Philips CPT License Agreement, which established a cross-licensing scheme for 
technologies relating to Super Audio CD and Digital Rights management, defined the difference as 
follows: 
 
“"Technically Essential CPT Patents": patents, the use of which is absolutely necessary for 
compliance with the specifications defining the Super Audio CD Copy Protection Technology. 
 
"Commercially Essential patents": patents relevant to the Super Audio CD Copy Protection 
technology, other than Technically Essential CPT Patents, for which no commercially viable 
alternative is available.”49 
 
No studies have been performed to determine the frequency in practice of commercially essential 
patents which are capable of blocking standards implementers, but it is clear that the potential risk of 
such essential patents undermines the acceptance of traditional essentiality definitions – if the actors 
cannot be sure that they will be able to implement the standard once access to all formally essential 
patents has been obtained, the predictability of the system will be minimal. At the same time, 
regulations on commercially essential patents will be far more difficult to establish, as the risk of 
infringing competition law requirements will increase greatly.  
7.5 Regulatory Essentiality 
Yet another situational factor that can bring about de facto essentiality without de jure designation, is 
the relevant regulatory structure. While the focus in determining the basis of essentiality typically lies 
                                                     
49 Philips CPT License Agreement Reference Copy, available at 
http://www.licensing.philips.com/includes/download.php?id=4520&filename=3232.pdf 
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on emphasizing technical aspects and excluding commercial aspects, other factors, such as legislation 
and regulation are also ignored. Regulatory essentiality can arise in a situation where a number of 
technically equivalent solutions are available to perform a compliant implementation of the standard, 
but due to specific regulation affecting the industry, only one of these solutions is possible. Such 
regulation can for example take the form of environmental protection legislation or safety regulations 
– if, for example, limits are placed on the permissible level of exposure to radio frequency (RF) 
radiation, such limits might rule out the use of certain solutions, leaving actors no alternative but to 
use an approved method. The risk is usually small, and in the given example it is very unrealistic, for 
example, that a solution would be developed and even brought to market within conforming to the 
relevant regulatory structures, yet the risk remains. Such regulatory restrictions cannot, in the current 
SSO system, be predicted and circumvented – partly due to the fact that the standards setting process 
explicitly avoids taking such factors into account, but also due to the fact that the critical standards 
setting period usually precedes market entry by several years, whereas the reactive legislative process 
is not initiated until much later. If relevant regulatory limits are changed or introduced subsequent to 
standards setting, it might very well be the case that the alternatives available to standards 
implementers are reduced to a single, de facto essential alternative. 
7.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the uncertainty and lack of transparency surrounding the essentiality concept is a 
characterizing aspect of the current standardization system. It is an accepted fact that a declaration or 
determination of essentiality is necessary for the possibility of an effective implementation of a 
specification, but it is at the same time true that such determination has become too encompassing to 
be within the administrative range of current SSO‟s. At the same time, obviously, this creates 
possibilities for exploitation, and facilitates a pseudo-fraudulent declaration that is made only in order 
to gain licensing leverage without contributing significantly to technological advance. Such strategies 
are easy to develop, and will typically not carry a penalty as long as the uncertainty remains. Over all, 
however, it would seem that if the goal an efficient and reliable standardization system with minimal 
transaction costs, it is necessary to work to either reduce the uncertainty regarding essentiality 
declaration, or to limit the effects of such declaration by changing licensing behavior subsequent to the 
declaration of essentiality. 
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8. Licensing Term Declaration 
The conventional manner of determining the terms of a license agreement is in conjunction with the 
establishment of the agreement as such; entering into the license agreement per se hinges on the terms 
negotiated. Aspects such as cost, term and scope do not diverge as such from the purpose and existence of 
the agreement, and the only outside factors influencing these terms are the restraints and proscriptions 
inherent in civil legislation and competition law. As the determination of licensing terms presupposes the 
desire to reach an agreement, and the conclusion of the agreement presupposes the joint determination of the 
terms, these are usually seen as a single result of a single process. In the standardization context, however, 
determining license terms prior to negotiation of the agreement is not only possible, but to some extent 
considered to be a prerequisite of successful IPR handling in the standard. Committing to FRAND 
obligations, for example, which is traditional in most standards organizations, is a clear indicator of the 
desire to commit to preemptive term setting. However, as the commitment to FRAND is still, as mentioned, 
fairly vague, it is quite possibly to use the somewhat unusual nature of licensing within standardization to 
improve on the benefits of early term setting. 
8.1 Ex Post and Ex Ante Declaration 
Within standardization activities, a distinction is made between the ex post establishment of licensing terms, 
which is the way licensing is typically carried out, with the Latin word post signifying that terms are set 
after the standard is set, and the ex ante establishment, which refers to establishing terms prior to the 
determination of the standard (and specification). While, as mentioned, a commitment to FRAND is in some 
ways an ex ante declaration of terms, the term ex ante in these contexts is usually taken to refer to a more 
comprehensive declaration of terms, and typically includes the concept of ex ante declaration. While ex post 
is as mentioned the norm, ex ante term setting allows for a number of improvements specific to the issues 
that currently afflict telecommunications standardization. It has never been implemented on larger scale, 
except insofar that RF terms can be considered a form of ex ante royalty setting, but there are nevertheless a 
number of proponents of implementing ex ante royalty setting in modern standardization contexts. 
 
The common understanding of the concept of ex ante declaration on a meaningful scale, therefore, 
comprises two significant differences in terms of licensing behavior as compared with the current norm. 
Firstly, there is the difference between the economic rationales of actors ex ante and ex post the setting of 
the standard. Naturally, the projected exploitable economic value of the technology in question will alter 
dramatically depending on whether or not the specification is set, and whether or not it is clear if the IPR 
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related to the technology will be possible to convincingly declare essential. This means that in the ex post 
situation, actors with essential patents to license are fully able to exploit the dominant position that the 
technological lock-in effect creates, and will not be forced to relate their terms to competing technologies, 
except to the extent that this is required by other policies, such as royalty caps and FRAND obligations. In 
an ex ante setting, however, actors are still uncertain of the true potential value of a technology, and will be 
forced to take the terms declarations of competitors into account. This, in a way, helps to negate the skewed 
market consequences of technological lock-in in the field, while allowing for the control over the standard 
that also results from technological lock-in. 
 
The second significant difference is the act of declaration itself, which is a necessary component in the shift 
to ex ante term setting. Setting terms prior to the setting of the standard itself is of course meaningless 
unless this is done publicly – if the chosen licensing terms are fully declared to all potential licensees to the 
extent that they are set. Without such declaration, there will be no benefit to an ex ante consideration of 
licensing terms compared to an ex post strategy, and it will be impossible to hold actors to their obligations. 
This is in itself obvious, but the declaration component of ex ante term setting must be understood and 
appreciated in terms of the effect it would have on the standardization system, as the lack of transparency, 
and the secrecy of the current system, underlie much of the current system‟s failures and successes. 
Openness regarding terms would create a drastically different dynamic, the effects of which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the tools section of this thesis. 
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9. Conflicts within the system 
As has been demonstrated thus far, the telecommunications standardization system is the result of a 
number of processes coming together to form a hybrid market which exists at the intersection between 
regulation and openness. The market is ostensibly no longer centrally regulated, but is still largely 
governed by the SSO‟s that uphold a more static approach to market interaction, and the dynamic 
interplay between the members of these bodies helps create the structures that make up the system. 
With such a diverse and unique context, it is inevitable that there are conflicts within the system, and 
as the interests of the actors determine the very structure of the system, the conflicts constitute some of 
the underlying foundations of the system as such. Therefore, in order to understand the system as a 
whole, it is necessary to examine those conflicts that are most structurally relevant for the system, and 
to understand their effects on the actors in the market. 
9.1 Disparity in IP control throughout the value chain 
Within the standardization system, there is a clear quantitative disparity in terms of IP control, a 
situation which has been alternately labeled a problem, a necessity, and a useful inevitability
50
. IP 
ownership is concentrated in the „early‟ parts of the value chain, as is typical of systems where 
research-intensive products are packaged and sold by others than the original inventors. IP holdings 
taper off as one proceeds through the chain, until the final actors have very little standards-related IP 
of their own, if any. IP-control, naturally, is the means by which those actors without direct contact 
with the market manage to maintain their presence and negotiation position throughout the market. 
Without this means of control, the actors closer to the market would be able to use their presence on 
the market to create an inordinately strong bargaining position, as they would effectively control 
access to the customers. Actors earlier in the chain would then have to accede to the demands of the 
retailers, or approach the market themselves, foregoing the advantages to efficiency and core focus 
that are possible when the creation of the physical product can be left to others. IP-control, then, is the 
natural means by which an actor can specialize in a specific niche early in the value chain, and still 
retain a degree of control over the finalized product – if by no other means then at least through the 
ability to sue for infringement. 
 
However, the disparity in IP control is beginning to chafe at some actors, who view the concentration 
of power that IP implies as an unbalanced restriction on the freedom to act of down-stream actors. The 
                                                     
50 Tellingly, one interview subject compared the disparity to “the product disparity between retailers and customers.” 
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costs, primarily, of removing the IP obstacles and obtaining access to the intellectual content through 
licensing are a cause for concern, and some actors claim that these costs have accumulated to a point 
where they are hampering the very possibility of providing a reasonably priced end-product
51
. While 
the effects on end-product pricing may be exaggerated, or to a considerable extent attributable to other 
factors than licensing costs, the secrecy and lack of transparency regarding licensing situations have 
created a speculative environment where actors make ostensibly objective claims aligned primarily 
with their own interests. For example, informal assessments by major IP-holders in the industry hold 
that licensing costs indirectly contribute somewhere between five and ten percent of the final retail 
cost of any given mobile terminal, whereas similar assessments by operators close to the market 
estimate that such costs constitute up to thirty percent of the same retail price. Furthermore, it is often 
claimed that the transaction costs of negotiating the numerous licenses necessary for standards 
compliance are, in and of themselves, prohibitive, as the number of actors, declared essential patents, 
and, of course, licensing arrangements, increases with each generation of telecommunications 
technology. 
9.2 Submarine Patents and Hold-up Situations 
One widely acknowledged cause of conflicts within the current standardization system, and a source 
of criticism against hands-off SSO dispute policies is the problem of submarine patents. Submarine 
patents, in the perhaps most widely used definition of the term, have been defined by a US court as 
patents which "remain 'submerged' during a long ex parte examination process and then 'surface' upon 
the grant of the patent," allowing the patent holder to "demand high royalties from non-patent holders 
who invested and used the technology not knowing that patent would later be granted."
52
 This problem 
was a definite source of conflict in the first-to-file patent system of the United States, and was 
therefore addressed by US Congress in 1994.
53
 The implemented changes proved largely successful in 
dealing with the problem, and submarine patents are now, in most fields, a rare occurrence rather than 
an unpredictable, ever-present threat. 
 
In telecommunications, however, the threat of submarine patents has far from disappeared, and is 
considered to be a mounting problem with each generation of telecommunications technology
54
. This 
can largely be ascribed to the effective spread of standardization, and the effects of standardization on 
                                                     
51 “The price to our industry of the proposed licence fees are greater than the annual revenues to our industry from the activities requiring a 
licence,” Paul Davey, Strategic Relationships  Executive Vodafone Group Plc 
52 DiscoVision Assocs. v. Disc Mfg., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1749, 1756 n.11 (D. Del. 1997) 
53 The change instituted a 20-year term of protection from the date of patent filing, as opposed to patent grant, in USC 35 § 154, a change 
spurred to a large extent by implementation of the GATT and NAFTA agreements. 
54 Standards, Open Standards and IPR, presentation by Paul Davey,  
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actor behavior in terms of technology adoption. In a standardization context, the concept of submarine 
patents is widely accepted but does not refer specifically to patent applications and the examination 
process. The term is used on a more general level, on which submarine patents can be defined as 
patents which confer a disproportionate advantage on one actor after other actors in the field have 
taken important, irreversible decisions without being aware of the existence or significance of the first 
patent. This definition still includes the traditional form of submarine patents, but also includes the 
standardization-specific concept of technological „lock-in‟ as a contributing factor. Due to the current 
structure of the standards creation process, submarine patents can emerge at any time, after other 
actors in the industry have passed the „point of no return‟ in their decision-making process. 
 
In standards-oriented fields, the point of no return for actors fearing submarine patents is of course the 
actual setting of the standards (or specification). Once a standard has been set, members are more or 
less committed to using the technologies specified in the standard, and are thus vulnerable to claims 
from a submarine patent holder whose technologies have been included in the standard specification. 
This is the effect generally known as „technological lock-in‟55, and is a necessary cornerstone of an 
effective standards setting process – without a firm commitment to a specific collection of stated 
technologies, a standards specification in no way guarantees effective interoperability or compatibility. 
As this effect is both well understood and predictable, most SSO‟s have taken measures to reduce the 
risk of submarine patents, including drawing up policies that require members to openly declare their 
proprietary claims on technologies that will be included in a standards specification. The specifics of 
an effective declaration process is a hotly contested issue – at the moment no SSO‟s require their 
members to declare pending patent applications, and many SSO‟s opt not to make any demands of 
disclosure at all - but ultimately the greatest submarine patent threat is not addressed by such policies, 
as they can only be enforced (if at all) against members of the SSO, who would be bound in either 
case by the relevant respective licensing terms. The problem, naturally, relates rather to the scenario 
where actors outside of SSO‟s make proprietary claims on technologies that have already, through 
their inclusion in standards specifications, been „locked in‟ to the business activities of the SSO 
members. As these actors are not bound by the terms of SSO membership policies, they have no 
incentives to declare their patents before the standard is set, nor is it in their interest to conform to 
FRAND licensing terms. 
                                                     
55 The term lock-in is borrowed from the field of economics, where it is also called “path dependence” – a scenario where an inferior 
solution dominates because the costs of switching to superior alternatives are prohibitive. In the current case, the switching cost is of course 
exclusion from the standard, and thus from interoperability. 
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9.3 Hold-up Licensing 
A second, usually complementary problem that faces the telecommunications industry in the era of 
standardization is that of „hold-up‟ licensing practices56. Hold-up is described as the situation that 
arises when the owner of essential IPR waits until lock-in has been achieved in a standard, and then 
uses this position to charge supracompetitive prices for the technology. As the other actors are then 
committed to using this technology in order to achieve a compliant implementation of the standard, the 
IPR-holder is free to ignore the pressures of the market that would otherwise drive down the price. 
This situation is similar to that of submarine patents, but there is no requirement here that a patent is 
„submerged‟ – a patent that is used as a basis for hold-up licensing might very well be flagged early on 
in the standards setting process, but with the assumption that access to any essential patents will be 
available on reasonable terms (or, as will be discussed later in this thesis, fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminating).  
 
For many, this is one of the most astonishing assumptions of the standardization system - the 
assumption that certain price levels are „reasonable‟ even if they are lower than what actors may be 
willing to pay. The rationale, of course, is that within the standardization system, the voluntary price 
levels that actors are willing to accede are artificially inflated by the lock-in effect discussed 
previously. Once actors submit to the lock-in effect, their willingness to pay no longer reflects any 
form of „natural‟ market price levels, and the correlation between market value and quality that is a 
natural underpinning of the free market system no longer exists. In response to this, the widespread 
assumption of „reasonable‟ price levels has arisen –without a price level set by dynamic market 
interaction, a constructed view of appropriate pricing arises, based to a large extent on individual 
approaches to the valuation of IPR´s, which helps keep the various actors on relatively reliable footing 
despite the absence of a stabilizing invisible hand (the most widely accepted definition of reasonable 
pricing, FRAND terms, will be discussed at a later point in this thesis). Diverging from this perceived 
norm, and opting instead to charge an individually determined price for access to essential IPR´s, 
results in behavior perceived as hold-up licensing. 
9.4 Submarine patents and hold-up – a question of 
interpretation 
As stressed in the definition of submarine patents and hold-up licensing, these behaviors (particularly 
hold-up licensing) are primarily, if not entirely, a matter of the perception of a behavior. The actions 
                                                     
56 Recognizing the procompetitive potential of royalty discussions in standard setting, Deborah Platt Majoras 
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taken by actors engaging in these behaviors are, on the surface, the actions that constitute regular, 
„reasonable‟ interaction in the standardization system. Licensing, for example, is always carried out 
after a standard is established and the lock-in effect sets in – licensees are contacted after they choose 
to perform a compliant implementation of the standard, which is by default after the technological 
standard has been finalized. At this point, royalty rates are also determined as a result of individual 
negotiations between the parties. Royalty rates cannot be declared ahead of time, for a number of 
reasons, and proprietary patents are not always declared by members – in the last couple of years, 
several major IPR-holders have initiated the practice of scrutinizing earlier patents to map them 
against the specifications of the standards, and thus apply old patents to new standards structures.
57
 In 
category, at least, these behaviors, which constitute the standard modus operandi for all IP-leveraging 
within the standardization system, match the behavior of submarine patent-holders and hold-up 
licensors
58
 exactly. 
 
The primary characteristics that are generally agreed to constitute marks of „unreasonable‟ behavior, 
and distinguish this behavior from normal licensing practices, would appear to be an intentional 
refusal to declare patents
59
, in order to create submarine patent situations, and price-setting that is 
markedly higher than „reasonable‟ levels. While there is an assumed consensus among many parties 
within the current standardization system as to where to draw the line that determines these behaviors, 
this consensus seems to correspond rather well with the position of those parties in past, ongoing and 
nascent conflicts – a definition drawn to party lines rather than objective evaluation. The definition of 
reasonable pricing, for example, is particularly difficult to ascertain as anything separate from the 
economic interest claims of the different actors, and the outrage expressed at many times is often 
„political noise‟ rather than an indicator of a deeper structural malady. A general indicator of 
reasonable pricing can in some cases be obtained retroactively by performing a study of past actor 
behavior, but this is difficult to do on a wider level as most license agreements, and their terms, tend to 
be closely guarded secrets. These difficulties must be kept in mind in the following examples of 
behavior that has been labeled „unreasonable‟ in the history of the standardization system. 
                                                     
57 Interviews. 
58 Often referred to as ‟patent trolls,‟ using a phrase coined by former Intel assistant general counsel Peter Detkin in 2001; the phrase is 
poorly defined, as pejoratives typically are, but seems to generally refer to those actors who out of self-interest would allow the goal of 
leveraging IPR into profit to interfere with the goal of bringing products to the market. 
59 While the discussion is usually expressed in terms of declaring ownership, it is often more relevant to declare essentiality; the issue of 
ownership of a patent is a public matter, but the essentiality of its claims to a standard is impossible to discover through any realistic regimen 
of patent searches. 
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9.4.1 The MPEG LA Submarine Patents 
In 2004, the Open Mobile Alliance began to finalize the process of establishing a Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) standard. The goal of this standard was to establish a regimen for measures 
intended to limit the opportunity for digital piracy of content in mobile phones, by setting safeguards 
against the unauthorized duplication or modification of data such as movies or music files. The 
expressed scope of the OMA DRM standard was “to enable the controlled consumption of digital 
media objects by allowing content providers to express usage rights,” and was intended thus as an 
initial step towards allowing content providers control over the freedom of behavior of customers – 
not only was the standard limited in scope of application, but also in terms of the tools used
60
 and was 
considered a stopgap measure to fill an urgent need for a standardized initiative in the area. It was 
hoped that this initiative would be easily implemented by members, and to assist in this, technologies 
were opted for with very few or no blocking IPR´s. 
 
The members of OMA who participated in setting the standard were not, however, independently 
responsible for the creation of the technologies that was selected for use in implementing the DRM 
measures. The OMA DRM standard (1.0) was made public on the 25
th
 of June, 2004, and within a 
month, another standard setting organization, MPEG LA, made an official call for companies to 
analyze this standard and determine whether or not they could claim that the technologies included 
were covered in any way by proprietary IPR´s – to determine, in effect, if any other actors „owned‟ the 
new DRM standard. This call was quickly answered by a number of organizations who were not 
members of OMA, including ContentGuard, Intertrust, Matsushita, Philips and Sony, who quickly 
joined MPEG LA in order to present a concerted license regime for the OMA DRM standard. All of 
these organizations naturally asserted that implementation of the OMA DRM standard constituted an 
infringement of their intellectual property rights, and initially requested a royalty fee set at one dollar 
for each mobile device implementing the standard, in addition to payment of 1% of the cost of any 
transaction in which content protected by the DRM in question was transferred. This royalty 
requirement would of course be added on top of the existing licensing arrangements, and would raise 
the price of a cell phone substantially while contributing a limited increase in functionality. 
 
The royalty requirements presented by MPEG LA immediately gave rise to sharp criticism from trade 
associations and industry actors, calling the demands “onerous, impractical and unclear” 61  and 
demanding changes. Not only were the demands criticized as excessive in terms of price, but the 
proposed terms would be difficult and costly to implement, and would significantly hinder adoption of 
                                                     
60 The tools used developed were 1) a Rights Expression Language, 2) specific Content format, and 3) Metadata. 
61 MEF (Mobile Entertainment Forum) Statement on MPEG LA licensing program for OMA DRM V1, 21 March 2005 
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the standard. While the intellectual property protection position of MPEG LA was relatively clear cut, 
and a full-on legal battle would have most likely allowed the MPEG LA consortium to block the 
adoption of the standard, the consortium compromised in the face of criticism and presented a reduced 
fee of 0.65 USD for each device sold, and a transaction royalty of 0.25 USD that would only be levied 
annually on the number of users of any DRM-protected subscription services. This reduced royalty 
scheme, still called by pundits “the most expensive royalty operation ever,”62 still met with opposition, 
and was rejected as being “unreasonable and unworkable”63 by many. Licenses for the original DRM 
standard were issued by MPEG LA in the beginning of 2005, but it was clear by then that the license 
package in question would not enjoy widespread adoption. Instead of working together, OMA and 
MPEG LA had become competitors for the standardization of mobile DRM, and some have gone so 
far as to claim that the consensus destruction resulting from MPEG LA‟s royalty requirements was a 
contributing factor to the lack of a homogenously adopted mobile DRM standard. 
9.4.2 Qualcomm Hold-Up Licensing 
The second situation illustrating potential or on-going conflicts in the system is not a discrete event, 
but rather a series of behaviors by an actor in the system; behaviors that have often been considered 
hold-up licensing or at least tantamount to such. The American company Qualcomm has long been 
known as an actor that refuses to uphold many of the generally accepted norms of the standardization 
system, or that at the very least interprets those norms differently. The difference in perspective here is 
one that has been touched upon in the discussion of MPEG LA, namely the difference between seeing 
essential IPR as a measurement of the investment an actor makes in a standard, and seeing it as a 
measurement of the potential for hindering the standard that‟s available to an actor. Theoretically, any 
actor in control of a patent that is clearly essential to a standard will be able to block the adoption of 
that standard by either refusing to license out the patent, or by licensing out at exorbitant rates. If the 
standard cannot be amended to circumvent the blocking patent, the standard will be abandoned. The 
opposite view holds that the obligations of FRAND, common to most SSO‟s, oblige participants to 
ensure that that their licensing terms are proportional, relative not only to the number of other essential 
patents mapping on to the standard, but also relative to the investment the actor has made in the 
technologies underlying the specification. 
 
The easiest means of economically quantifying the investment an actor makes in a technology is of 
course the amount spent on research and development leading to the advance in question. There is an 
assumed that in most cases, a large investment in research and development will lead to great 
                                                     
62 “Phone DRM: the most expensive royalty operation ever,” The Register, April 21st 2005 
63 GSM Association Press Release, May 4th 2005 
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advances in technology; that such advances will lead to a greater degree of adoption in the setting of 
the standard, and that this will ultimately be reflected in a large number of essential patents owned by 
the same actor. The reasoning, therefore, espoused by proponents of proportionality, is that ownership 
of a large percentage of the patents essential to a standard entitles an actor to a larger proportional 
share of the royalty base for that standard. This logic is at both perfectly reasonable within the 
standards context, and at the same time perfectly foreign to typical free market dynamics – 
considerations of resources invested and the profits of other actors are generally not something actors 
are forced to make when planning their own business strategy. The mechanism by which such 
behavior is encouraged and enforced, in theory, is of course the underlying agreement to abide by 
FRAND principles, which will be discussed at a later point in the essay. 
 
Actors who do not interpret FRAND to include limitations on licensing behavior related to 
proportionality naturally act differently, and Qualcomm is one actor that has become a prime example 
of explicitly refusing to view FRAND as a binding obligation to observe principles of proportionality 
derived largely by consensus. Qualcomm has repeatedly refused to participate in a number of 
initiatives to establish royalty caps and controlled licensing terms, and has even gone so far as to 
explicitly state that for the standardization of W-CDMA technologies, which are included in the so-
called 3G standard, Qualcomm expects to be able to charge a ten percent royalty of the sale of the end 
product if a single claim of a single patent owned by Qualcomm is infringed by the product (i.e. if the 
standard is implemented). This statement, per definition, contradicts flatly the ambitions of Ericsson 
and other IPR-holders to maintain cumulative royalty rates at a single digit level, as it is a clear 
announcement that Qualcomm‟s share alone will surpass that level. It is also a clear statement that 
Qualcomm does not consider proportionality or relativity to be criteria for FRAND behavior.  
 
Qualcomm‟s actions and statements have been criticized by other actors as incompatible with the 
purposes of standardization. While Qualcomm had been a significant contributor to the GSM standard, 
with its CDMA technologies, its contribution to wideband CDMA (W-CDMA) for the 3G standard 
was far less significant, yet the actor made statements to the effect that it expected a similar royalty 
proportion from implementers of 3G as it had received from GSM implementers. In the value network 
this would be represented as a minimal flow of technological value (represented by the single claim) 
from the actor, and a demand for disproportionate monetary compensation. The response to this has 
not only taken the form of complaints, but most recently also discussions on potentially forming a 
patent pool within the ETSI membership specifically designed to exclude Qualcomm‟s technology 
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area, as well as a formal complaint before the European Commission by a group of European IPR-
holders asserting that Qualcomm‟s “excessive royalties” are “in breach of competition law”64 
 
Qualcomm‟s behavior, however, shouldn‟t be viewed simply as a recalcitrant attempt at maximizing 
profits at the expense of progress, and attempts to cap royalty rates, while currently perhaps extremely 
necessary, are not simple acts of charity. While IPR-holders such as Nokia and Ericsson stand to lose 
licensing revenue on their essential patents by instituting a cap on licensing fees, they stand to gain a 
comparable amount in terms of in-licensing. As manufacturers of base stations and mobile terminals, 
these actors would obviously have to pay whatever license fees are set for that manufacturing. Being 
both IPR-holders and product developers, these actors can seemingly act against their best interests 
while actually lowering their licensing costs. This is the counterargument used by Qualcomm to reject 
royalty capping, and while it is not always applicable, and oftentimes irrelevant (when, for example, 
the party experiencing excessive royalty rates holds no IPR of its own), it demonstrates the complexity 
of the potential for conflict in the standardization system. 
9.4.3 The Motorola GSM approach 
In the late 1980‟s, the so-called GSM project, referring to the standardization of the so-called GSM 
generation of mobile telecommunications technology, was taking shape. In this process, European 
actors such as Ericsson had been significantly involved in providing and promoting some of the 
integral technologies that were to be implemented in the standard. During this period, Ericsson, like 
many other actors involved in the process, chose to patent restrictively, allowing the process to 
develop gradually and holding off on securing intellectual property rights. This patenting behavior was 
based on older IPR strategies that were more focused on the successful widespread adoption of the 
standard through technological superiority, and far less on the need for a comprehensive IPR network 
to facilitate such diffusion. 
 
Other actors, particularly outside Europe, had already begun to abandon this strategy of the 
„gentlemen‟s agreement‟ not to patent. Motorola, as one of the few non-European actors involved in 
the creation of the GSM standard, opted to increase its patenting pace based on the decisions that were 
being taken in the standards setting organs, and secured a number of patents on technologies essential 
to the new standards. Some of these technologies were in many respects based on the advances 
pioneered by Ericsson, as a result of Ericsson‟s investments in both research and development and 
                                                     
64 “Qualcomm committed to standard setting organisations that it would license its technology on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. In spite of this and in breach of competition law, Qualcomm is charging excessive and disproportionate royalties. This means 
ultimately that consumers may have to pay more than they should for their mobile handsets." Kasim Alfalahi, Vice President IPR Licensing 
and Patents, Ericsson AB – Company statement to the Commission, October 28th, 2005 
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standards setting organ participation. However, as Ericsson had not consolidated their creation with 
structural support in the administrative arena, they found themselves in the position of paying royalties 
for the use of technologies that, to a large extent, they had been involved in developing. While some 
felt that this was a violation of a certain moral right to the results of research and development, it was 
clear that Motorola had the undeniable legitimacy of the patent office on their side, and Ericsson was 
forced to settle in an out of court licensing arrangement. 
 
To some extent, this situation is less indicative than the others cited in terms of demonstrating the 
problems inherent in the standardization system. It can be argued that the behavior of the European 
actors was outmoded and in fact inappropriate to the realities of a global standards system. Such a 
system must necessarily build on the widespread use of IPR, and barring the establishment of an 
authoritative, world-spanning administrative authority, it will be equally necessary for actors to 
maintain and monitor their own rights in this regard. After all, the behavior of Motorola, while 
considered inappropriate and perhaps immoral by many at the time, is difficult to distinguish from 
regular licensing behavior. While the situation could technically be classified as one of submarine 
patenting in the broadest sense, i.e. that of technological lock-in combining with an insufficient 
awareness of essential patents, Motorola cannot be said to have acted as a „rogue‟ in the system, but 
rather only not „in sync‟ with Ericsson‟s expectations. In the end, this situation was resolved through 
license negotiations, and prompted a clear change in patenting behavior on the part of Ericsson. 
9.5 Changing the system through conflict 
As is obvious by now, the standards system constitutes a hybrid market, with highly specific 
conditions and practices. It is no longer the regulated system of the PTTs, in which issues of product 
quality, compensation, and innovation were resolved through official decrees, but neither is it a free 
market, where such issues are driven by market forces and dynamics such as supply and demand, and 
competitive pricing. The standards system is a compromise between these models, and the problems 
and conflicts it experiences can typically be viewed as the efforts of the actors to establish the 
mechanisms that will serve in lieu of government regulation and free market pressures – all the while, 
naturally, defending their own interests. 
 
Certain actions, such as the aggressive royalty demands of Qualcomm and the submarine approach of 
the MPEG LA consortium, show a marked tendency to try to drive the system in the direction of free 
market rules. In essence, both actors based their course of action not on what the majority of the 
industry would claim should be done, but on what these two actors could do, based on maximal 
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exploitation of their respective positions. This is the laissez faire logic of the free market, and is an 
obvious refusal to recognize the implicit structures of the system. On the other side of the spectrum, 
efforts such as the complaint before the European Commission by, among other actors, Ericsson, are 
clear attempts to formalize the implicit structures of the system through the use of judicial decisions, 
creating formal acceptance outside the standards system for the norms established by the actors. While 
this does not represent a return to the fully regulated system of the PTTs, it is obviously intended to 
formalize existing structures and avoid a transition to an unregulated free market, where actors are free 
to exploit their strategic positions without concern for the current balance. 
 
Ultimately it is clear that the system is still susceptible to change, and to efforts with the aim of 
bringing about change. The actions of the standardization actors in these conflicts must therefore be 
seen in a wider perspective – not only are they reacting to the realities of the standards landscape and 
the demands of other actors, but they are also constantly striving, consciously or not, to alter the terms 
on which future transactions will take place. Mapping the current system, therefore, is not only a 
useful tool for establishing an overview of the present situation, but is also a necessary means of 
planning for long-term strategy and changes to the system as a whole. Creating formal support for the 
existing structures of the system will require activities that reach beyond the current business arena 
and invoke structures on other arenas – such as legal challenges, which establish support on the 
judicial arena by creating case law and precedent that can be used to scrutinize future behavior. In this 
way, conflict is not only an unfortunate obstacle to progress, but also a means of creating a more 
robust standardization system. 
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10. Future scenarios 
In this following chapter four probable scenarios are going to be discussed and analyzed in order to 
identify threats or potential with these future scenarios. The scenarios presented are derived from 
discussions with representatives at a major IP-holder in Sweden within the telecommunication 
industry as well as influenced by the ongoing discussions within the different SSO’s between operators 
and IP-holders.  
So far in this thesis, an overall perspective on the workings of the current European 
telecommunications standardization system has been provided. In this overview, a number of issues 
were identified that could be perceived as flaws within the system or sources of conflict. Some of 
these issues are more abstract, being issues only in relation to a perceived optimal system, whereas 
others are highly concrete and have already prompted actors to initiate measures that aim to alleviate 
these issues by implementing changes to the current structures of the standardization system. This is in 
line with another key conclusion of this thesis, namely the fact that the standardization system, being 
almost entirely a creation of market actors acting on a pseudo-formalized business arena, is a system 
in flux, capable of constant evolution and changes spurred by its members. 
 
As a result of the fact that the system as such is defined by its members and participants, it is 
impossible to say in any meaningful way whether these initiatives can objectively be considered 
„problems‟ in the system or merely tactical measures attempted by those members to increase their 
control and ultimate market share. As the system to some extent incorporates free market concepts of 
competition, there will be inevitably exist tension between actors, which will be expressed in various 
forms. This is not to say, however, that the system as such cannot be improved, either through shaping 
it towards subjective improvement based on the current position of the actor, or through actions 
intended to bring about a net gain for all actors. While assessing the possibility of such beneficial 
change is not within the scope of this thesis, it is recognized that changes to the system can bring 
positive effects, but also that an actor wanting to ensure that these effects are in line with its goals 
must be aware of the various means by which the system can change, and how these changes should 
optimally be implemented. 
 
In the following four sections, therefore, a number of tools that allow actors to bring about such 
changes are analyzed and assessed for their strategic value to actors in the standardization system. As 
has already been discussed, some of these tools are initiatives that have already been identified and 
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proposed as changes to current structures. For example, the challenges to ETSI by the Vodafone-led 
coalition of operator actors incorporates several tools for altering the system that all aim to bring about 
a reduction in suspected unreasonable licensing fees burdening the standardized value change. For this 
reason, these tools should also be viewed as potential future scenarios of change in the system, as the 
tools may be implemented by any actor in the system with greatly different effect – what may appear 
to be a tool for beneficial change in the hands of one actors will be seen as a weapon in the hands of its 
competitors or customers. For this reason, the analysis primarily takes an actor-neutral perspective to 
these tools, but also notes instances where specific actor categories can employ the tools to clearly 
different effects.  
 
The four tools chosen for analysis and discussion are: 
- Implementing a policy of declaring licensing terms ex ante in standards organizations; 
- Establishing restrictions on permissible royalties in licensing arrangements; 
- Instituting patent pools to manage the processes of standardizing technological innovation outside 
existing standards organizations; and 
- Creating new standardization organizations, or changing the member compositions of existing 
organizations. 
Some of these tools are more likely to be implemented than others, and some have been recommended 
or even partly implemented in the past. The tools should be understood in a general context of a 
standardization system roughly approximate to that of the European telecommunications market today. 
10.1 Ex Ante declaration 
Shifting to an ex ante model for declaration of licensing terms is a tool for creating legitimacy in the 
administrative system of the SSO‟s, through increasing the structural support for the handling of IPR. 
This will have a number of benefits, and will create an analogue to the legitimacy on the 
administrative arenas enjoyed in markets where the connections between the arenas are more stable. 
One benefit will be the added reliability of the system experienced by actors, as the public declaration 
of terms will allow them to hold other actors to their stated commitments. The more specific these 
declarations are, the more reliably can actors be expected to uphold their commitments, on a near-
contractual basis. The current situation, where actors commit only to a general FRAND obligation, 
leaves the process of actually determining the license terms fairly unpredictable. The benefits of 
shifting to an ex ante structure would primarily include increased transparency, reliability, and a shift 
in the competitive pressure within the system. 
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10.1.1 Competition Asymmetry 
While there are many benefits to the adoption of an ex ante declaration of licensing terms, one of the most 
pressing reasons arguments is being advanced by standards implementing actors who are experiencing the 
effects of competition asymmetry. This asymmetry arises from a lack of continuity in the interface between 
the semi-regulated context of standards setting and the free market context which characterizes interaction 
with the end consumer. In the standards setting context, competition ostensibly only exists in terms of 
technical superiority – the best solution for a standard is adopted, regardless of cost or practicality. Naturally, 
as discussed earlier, this is not the entire truth of the mechanisms of the standards system, but it is clear that 
economic pressure is not a primary competition factor in the context of standards setting. In the free market 
context of standards implementation, where actors interact directly with the end customer, competition is 
primarily price-based, meaning that competitiveness is primarily achieved by reducing margins and cutting 
costs. 
 
Competition asymmetry arises when the effects of competition at one extreme of the value chain do not 
sufficiently influence behavior on the other extreme, and competition takes place on different terms and 
with different objectives. There is always a degree of competition asymmetry inherent in any value chain, as 
the concept of the chain implies naturally that not all actors are immediately exposed to the end-level of the 
free market, but the typical tendency is for the competition pressure experienced by actors at the bottom of 
the chain to be redistributed upwards to some extent through the interfaces in the chain. In the 
standardization system, however, this is impossible due to the lock-in effect of standards setting. No matter 
how much economic pressure is exerted on market actors, their concerns will not necessarily affect the 
adoption of technology if the adoption process is shielded from economic pressure by the policies and 
institutions of the standards setting organization.   
 
Shifting a system where license agreement terms are decided and disclosed ex ante would obviously 
alleviate the immediate problems of competition asymmetry, and would allow economic competition 
pressure to be distributed more evenly throughout the telecommunications value chain. While technology 
selection in the determination of a specification would still be performed on the basis of technical 
superiority, term setting would become a transparent process, visible to all interested parties. This 
transparency would allow SSO members to judge the level of commitment each member has to the 
principles of FRAND licensing, as it would be clear immediately what level of royalties each would be 
willing to demand. As a natural consequence of this, it would also be possible to enforce the consensus 
understanding of FRAND in practice, as it would be possible to adapt the specification and the ultimate 
standard being set to exclude those technologies where the IP-holder is unwilling to commit to what is seen 
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as fair and reasonable. Ultimately, as most SSO‟s build on the principle of open participation, this means 
that standards implementing actors close to the market will have the opportunity to provide their input into 
the situation and help shape the behavior of IP-holding actors. 
10.1.2 Further Benefits 
Establishing an ex ante declaration structure would, as mentioned, also lead to added transparency, as 
members of the SSO‟s will be able to openly evaluate and debate the interpretation of the terms posed. 
Each actor will still be bound by the obligations that exist in the SSO policy, such as FRAND 
licensing, but the interpretation of those obligations will no longer be hidden in secret license 
arrangements but will be available for discussion by all members. Whether or not an enforcement 
mechanism is established to complement the ex ante declaration policy, such discussions will 
inevitably help shape the consensus on how FRAND should be interpreted and allow actors to make 
more informed choices. It is also very likely that the transparency of ex ante declaration will motivate 
actors to adjust their royalty requests to adhere more closely to the consensus baseline, in order to 
avoid the risk of being excluded from future standards collaboration. 
 
In terms of facilitating efficient actor behavior, introducing an ex ante declaration policy will also 
obviously reduce transaction costs, as the need for lengthy negotiation will be lowered. Actors will be 
able to make informed choices regarding the choice of licenses early on in the standardization process, 
and the actual process of negotiating the license will be primarily a question of confirming the terms 
and add the inevitable details, which will be far less costly in terms of time and resources than 
establishing a mutual understanding of applicable FRAND concepts within the context of the 
negotiation. 
10.1.3 The risks of ex ante declaration 
While altering the standardization system to incorporate the ex ante declaration could resolve many of 
the perceived problems in the current standardization system structure, there are also potential risks to 
implementing such a tool. One reason is the obvious contradiction between the concept of price fixing 
as regulated in antitrust laws and the consensus made possible by the ex ante declaration of licensing 
terms. One of the central tenets of most antitrust regulation systems, after all, is the prohibition on the 
collusive determination of pricing.
65
 Collaborating to jointly set a price that is not, as such, determined 
by supply and demand and market conditions removes the consumer-beneficial effects of competition, 
and can create a situation where price levels are artificially inflated. Any situation where actors, 
                                                     
65 In European antitrust regulation, for example, this is expressed in Article 81 of the EC treaty. 
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particularly competing actors, jointly and explicitly state the price levels, or the levels of factors 
influencing price, such as royalties, of a product before it reaches the market is therefore, on the face 
of it, a direct violation of competition law, which would be the case in terms of ex ante declarations of 
license terms. 
 
Competition law, however, as mentioned earlier, is fairly unique among the legislative norm structures 
in that it is highly sensitive to the consequences of regulation. Unlike criminal law, competition law 
measures aim entirely to achieve a beneficial effect on market conditions, and if certain principles are 
violated to achieve that effect, such behavior is still considered legal within the greater context. In the 
case of ex ante declaration, it is recognized that there is a clear potential for greater benefit than harm, 
as the current structure of the standardization system invites greater anti-competitive effect than would 
exist in a system utilizing ex ante declarations.
66
 For this reason, the risk of meeting opposition from 
antitrust authorities when using this tool is most likely minimal. 
10.1.4 Implementation aspects 
Another problem that would most likely arise if an ex ante regime were to be implemented would be 
an increase in requirements on the administrative systems of existing SSO‟s. In order to ensure that ex 
ante declarations are recorded, disseminated, and comparably structured, some form of central 
administrative function will be necessary. This in itself will require an increase in structural 
complexity that can be costly and time-consuming, as few SSO‟s are currently prepared to take on 
such active roles in standards work, and the administrative cost would only increase once members 
begin to dispute the implementation of ex ante declarations. Since consensus would have to be reached 
on the level of detail to be included in the declarations, the time-period to allow for declarations, and 
the sanctions for incomplete or absent declarations, it would be necessary for the SSO‟s to also 
manage complaints, disputes, and questions of interpretation to a satisfactory degree, all of which 
would require great investments in administrative structure creation. 
 
Finally, the introduction of ex ante declaration would most likely delay the process of setting the 
actual standard, though it is uncertain by how much. While the ex ante declarations would make the 
overall process more transparent, it would still be possible for actors to try to wield influence through 
power games and politics, by, for example, trying to obscure the terms of their declarations while 
appearing compliant, or attempting to exploit the time of their declaration to force early commitment. 
On the whole, such tactical manipulation, combined with the additional administrative effort, would 
mean that standards setting as such would become a slower process compared to the already 
                                                     
66 One proponent of this view is the chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission, Deborah Majorah Platt 
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cumbersome structure of today. It must be kept in mind, however, that to some extent this delay will 
be offset by the increase in efficiency in the licensing process as such, which will mean that 
subsequent development and dissemination of the standardized technology will be far more efficient. 
10.2 Royalty restrictions 
Another tool for changing the current standardization system through altering reigning SSO policies is 
that of restrictions on the level of royalties permissible to demand in a license negotiation. To some 
extent, FRAND obligations fall within this category, as they require members to maintain a 
„reasonable‟ royalty level, yet the vagueness of such obligations typically means that they are not 
viewed as royalty restrictions per se. For royalty restrictions to be effective as a tool for resolving 
issues in the system, it is necessary for those restrictions to be explicit and fixed, so that they have an 
appreciable effect on actor behavior. The restrictions that will be dealt with in this section include 
royalty free licensing, and capped royalties. 
10.2.1 Royalty free licensing 
Royalty free, or RF, licenses are a well established practice in many other standards; standards that are 
often referred to as „true‟ open standards. The ambition with such licensing schemes is to create 
standards that are unencumbered by proprietary IPR claims, which is accomplished by ensuring that 
access to the intellectual property being standardized is granted on an unequivocally free basis to all 
interested actors without discrimination. This requirement applies not only to direct monetary 
compensation, whether running or fixed, but also to other forms of compensation such as cross-
licenses and similar arrangements. For this reason, it could be more accurate to call this licensing 
arrangement compensation free instead. 
10.2.1.1 The Benefits of RF Licensing  
The strategic reason for adopting RF licensing scheme is to open up innovation, through maximizing 
access. By making sure that all actors in the field are free to access the technologies in the standard 
without obstacles of compensation requirements, the innovation as such becomes open in the sense of 
contribution, participation, and access to results. The reasons for doing so vary from the idealistic to 
that of sheer necessity, but in the case of telecommunications standardization, the motivation would 
primarily be the fact that increased adoption makes the standard a more suited tool for shaping the 
market to fit the purpose of creating added downstream revenue opportunities. If the extent of 
adoption can be maximized, the customer base for the products based on the standard will most likely 
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constitute a significant part of the available market, barring any unforeseen, typically technology-
related, developments, such as the invention of a clearly superior alternative. 
When deciding on the use of RF licensing as a strategic tool for market shaping, a choice has to be 
made by each actor between the forecasted product-based revenue and royalty revenues. If RF 
licensing, for example, is considered a necessary prerequisite for the successful adoption of the 
standard, which could be the case in a global market with several competing standards within the same 
field, then that must be a factor that inevitably weighs against potential product revenues. On the other 
hand, if RF licensing is not necessary for the standard to be „successful‟ but is nonetheless capable of 
extending the scope of adoption, the gains in potential product value might not be sufficient to 
outweigh the risks of establishing RF as a policy – especially as such a policy might not only be costly 
to implement but difficult to remove once implemented. While it is possible, it is rare to be able to 
balance the two revenue opportunities inherent in the innovation simultaneously – by licensing out 
IPR on a non-discriminating basis, after all, one enables potential competitors to achieve similar 
technical advantages, and becomes less able to compete on the basis of innovative superiority. 
10.2.1.2 Benefits of Implementing RF Licensing 
Implementing RF licensing schemes faces no particular legal or formal obstacles, and is therefore 
possible to implement without great investments in the structural capabilities of the SSO‟s. While it is 
true that the act of determining compensation ahead of time in collusion is a typical violation of 
antitrust regulation, this form of legislation sees primarily to the actual effect on the market of 
behavior that could formally be considered anticompetitive. Even if an agreement is technically in 
violation of antitrust recommendations, it will not be illegal per se if it leads to demonstrable positive 
effect for the competitive environment on the market and the ultimate customer benefit. As RF 
licensing maximizes technology diffusion, boosts research and development, and leads to improved 
product lines, the fact that it could be seen as a cartel agreement does not mean that it is an illegal 
cartel agreement.  
 
One could potentially argue that a reigning RF licensing scheme on a market shuts out those actors 
who cannot reasonably afford to make their research available on these terms, as they do not have 
enough of a presence on the market to support their activities through product revenue. These 
arguments are unlikely to influence the competition law authorities, as the primary object of 
competition law regulation to support healthy market activities. Those actors who are not intending to 
maintain an active market presence are not, after all, the focus of competition law as such, and might 
be considered obstacles to traditional market activities rather than providing actual benefits. 
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In terms of administrative structures, implementing a royalty free regime would require SSO‟s to take 
a somewhat more active role, yet there is little additional burden in the monitoring and enforcement 
of the terms. Actors will be unable to use market clout to push through license terms that could 
„theoretically‟ be considered royalty free, and a refusal to license, or a refusal to license on RF terms, 
will be immediately obvious and can be disclosed as such by the intended licensee. Conflict 
resolution could be successfully carried out on the judiciary arena, as the commitment to royalty free 
licensing would be a contractual obligation rendering civil liability, and would not be difficult for the 
court to interpret. 
 
Furthermore, the process of setting a specification would be far less encumbered by administrative 
obstacles, and considerations of IPR during the discussions would only need to be taken into account 
insofar as to ensure that no aspect of the specification is covered by proprietary claims belonging to 
actors outside the standard. Naturally, designing the specification to avoid technology clearly 
belonging to outside actors would be an administrative burden, but such considerations are always 
necessary to make in any standardization efforts. 
10.2.1.3 Risks of RF licensing 
While there are clear advantages to implementing RF licensing as a means of opening up innovation, 
there are also certain drawbacks to doing so. Enforcing a royalty free licensing scheme will have the 
obvious effect of serving as a disincentive to those actors whose primary interest in the 
standardization system lies in licensing and IP-related royalties. While actors who are both active in 
the product market and in licensing out their related intellectual property might be able to adjust, the 
actors whose core business area relies on licensing revenues will find it more profitable to remain 
outside the standards organizations that implement this policy, in order to ensure that they are not 
forced to commit to signing away their primary source of income. Royalty free licensing schemes are 
usually mostly suited to situations where the actors involved share a strong sense of a common goal 
and are willing to forego certain possibilities in order to achieve an end result beneficial to all actors.  
 
The common goal motivating the adoption of a royalty free licensing scheme would be the 
maximization of the end-user customer base, at the expense of the midrange customer base. From the 
perspective of those actors whose primary goal is to sell products and services to the end-user 
customer, the customer base exists at the very end of the value chain, and a royalty free licensing 
scheme would not greatly affect the possibility of deriving economic benefit from this group. For 
actors whose primary goal is to license out and leverage IP, customers exist at a much higher level in 
the value chain, and committing to a royalty free requirement would sharply curtail their ability to 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
85 
derive economic returns on their research and development. These actors would then be faced with a 
choice of how to respond to such a policy – either avoid the system altogether, with the effect that 
potentially crucial technologies are lost to the development of the standard, or attempt a hold-up 
strategy similar to that of the fabled „patent troll‟. While such behavior might be frowned upon, it 
could potentially be tolerated on occasion in a system where royalties are otherwise absent. 
 
A further problem inherent in the royalty free solution is that the increase in the rate of technology 
diffusion will most likely be matched by a decrease in the rate of technology development. Even 
those actors who remain within the system and commit to the royalty free terms will be in a situation 
where committing all their relevant technologies to the joint standard can be discouraged. This is both 
a risk and a boon – as actors no longer have the ability to derive extra revenue from submitting 
technologies of dubious essentiality to a specification, their contributions will be limited to those 
technologies that are most crucial to the end result (the product on which they will make money). 
Standards will no longer be plagued by an overwhelming number of declarations of essential IPR, 
some of which have been evaluated to be of lesser value for the standard, but at the same time, the 
economic incentives for creating these peripheral technologies will be lowered, as it will no longer be 
possible to assure oneself of licensing revenue by declaring the technology essential.  
 
The economic rationale behind research will shift in complex ways, but the end result will naturally 
be that technological process becomes slower and more focused. Most likely, research efforts will aim 
at contributing a moderate base-line of core technology development to ensure that the standard as 
such does not lag behind, and a more specific focus on crucial secondary technologies that are not 
essential in and of themselves. At the same time the technological scope encompassed by the 
standards might also shift in response to the problems in obtaining consensus, and the desire for 
actors to keep the scope of technologies being subject to RF obligations. The result will most likely be 
that future telecommunications standards, operating under an RF regime, would be smaller in scope 
but global in adoption, and that it would no longer be possible to standardize an entire „generation‟ of 
cellular phone technology 
10.2.1.4 Implementing RF licensing 
The negative aspects of implementing RF licensing in existing SSO‟s would not take the shape, 
primarily, of legal or administrative hurdles. While the process of shifting to a new licensing regime 
would require an initial investment in structural creation to handle both the establishment of the terms 
and the process of information dissemination (as well as the process of coming to the decision of 
making the transition), this would not present an insurmountable obstacle. As mentioned earlier, there 
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are few reasons from an administrative or legal perspective why implementing an RF regime would be 
difficult, and as there is a great deal of experience of and tradition established with the practice of RF 
in other fields, the process can be reasonably facilitated. 
 
The difficulty, however, in implementing an RF regime in the current telecommunications 
standardization system is in achieving consensus on the initiative. Many of the actors involved in the 
system are heavily dependent on their revenues from out-licensed IPR, and would strongly oppose the 
creation of a generally applicable RF policy. Actors such as Qualcomm, whose technological 
developments extend further than their product involvement, have opposed similar measure in the past, 
including such moderate attempts as the introduction of royalty caps, and would most likely refuse to 
include their technologies in any further attempt at reducing the revenue potential of their IPR. As 
these actors are members in their own right in the open SSO‟s, they are able to affect the development 
of SSO policy, besides also controlling technologies that are crucial for the development of current 
technological standards. 
 
In order to overcome the obstacle of a lack of consensus, there are two primary alterations to the RF 
concept that can be implemented. First of all, the extent of RF licensing can be limited in certain 
respects, in order to ensure to try to minimize controversy. The area affected by the RF policy can be 
limited to, for example, certain projects, or certain technologies, or it can be limited to certain forms of 
IPR. Putting such limitations on the scope, however, will of course lead to a greater need for 
administrative structures – for example, determining the scope of IPR other than patents can be 
difficult, both in terms of establishing ownership, as copyrights are not registered in the same fashion 
as patents, but also in terms of reconciling the disparate views on the nature of software IPR. If 
software copyright were to be determined to be subject to an RF regime, problems would not only 
arise when considering American actors who have both patent rights and copyrights applicable to their 
software, but it would also most likely that most European actors would argue that their software is 
integrally implemented in a hardware solution, and would thus try to obtain patents that would not be 
subject to RF terms. Yet another way of limiting the cope of RF restrictions would be to base the 
limitations explicitly or implicitly on the actors that would be affected – to ensure that those actors 
most opposed to RF terms would not be involved in the development of RF standards. This is an 
obvious solution, but runs into the obvious problem of giving a clear appearance of unfair treatment. 
 
The second limitation on RF licensing that can be implemented to minimize problems would be to 
determine, as alluded to earlier, that the RF obligation applies solely to licenses granted to other 
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members of the SSO, meaning that it would still remain possible to grant royalty-based licenses to 
actors outside the organization. This would have the effect of limiting the effect on royalty revenues of 
licensors, and would also ensure reciprocity in the licensing structures of participants in the 
standardization system. The perception that outside actors would reap the technological value created 
by the research of the SSO members without contributions of their own would be ameliorated, and 
incentives would be created for outside actors to join the SSO and contribute to the development of 
standards. The global dissemination of the standard in question might then be hampered, but 
secondary obligations such as FRAND could then be applied to the practice of licensing to non-
members. 
10.2.2 Royalty caps 
Royalty caps refer to the practice of setting a cap, or a limit, on the amount of royalties members of an 
SSO can be permitted to extract for their licenses. Royalty caps can take a number of different forms, 
depending on which factors are considered most relevant: the caps can be relative to product price; the 
ceiling can be calculated on an individual or a cumulative basis, and the timeline for determining the 
cap can be adjusted or running. Much as in RF licensing, it is understood that the requirements of a 
royalty cap should not be circumventable through unreasonably onerous requirements of other forms 
of compensation such as cross-licensing, though it can be assumed that some forms of compensation, 
not obviously exceeding the value of the royalties as capped, could be permitted. 
10.2.2.1 Benefits of implementing royalty caps 
In effect, the difference between royalty caps and FRAND obligations is primarily that royalty caps 
constitute a tool for controlling licensing proceedings, and adding an element of administrative 
overview and control. While both measures aim to ensure that a functioning pricing approach is 
maintained even at the higher levels of the intellectual value chain, royalty caps include specific, 
explicit limitations that provide reliability and transparency in the system. Unlike FRAND obligations, 
instituting royalty caps in an SSO requires member consensus and will therefore create an open 
discussion of the terms that can be said to be reasonable for such caps. As mentioned earlier, one of 
the reasons for the current initiatives trying to bring about change in the system is the perceived lack 
of unreasonableness in the licensing fees levied, even though this is not based on any actual 
assessment of the royalties being paid in practice, as the specifics of such agreements are non-
transparent and secret. 
 
With an openly discussed and agreed-upon royalty cap in place, licensing negotiations would be 
somewhat speeded up, as parties would have an immediate assumption of the baseline value of the 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
88 
arrangement they would be negotiating for. This increase in efficiency would be offset, however, by 
the increased dependency on reliable valuation and measurement tools. Each license would not only 
have to take into account the monetary value of each aspect that is included in the license, so as not to 
exceed the cap, but there must also exist a continual consensus and shared valuation basis for the 
current total sum of licenses being required, and the ultimate product value derived from the 
technologies being standardized. Depending on how such issues are dealt with, license negotiations in 
conjunction with royalty caps might be either faster or considerably slower than such negotiations 
under FRAND obligations. 
10.2.2.2 Risks of implementing royalty caps 
A clear risk that can arise when changing standardization structures through establishing royalty caps 
is of course the risk that arises whenever royalty opportunities are restricted – the risk that actors with 
heavy investments in research and intellectual value development and few opportunities for deriving 
product-based revenue will no longer support the system. A royalty cap, much like an RF regime, 
requires consensus from all members of the organization in which it is to be effective, and if the cap is 
seen to impact royalty revenues excessively, that consensus will be difficult to attain; conversely, if 
the royalty cap is considered to be high, IP implementers will chafe at the now transparent burdens 
they would be facing. Naturally, therefore, negotiations preceding any such alteration of existing 
structures would be lengthy and require an in-depth analysis of the state of the system and the 
requirements of each actor. For an intellectual value creator, the projected results of the cap would 
have to be weighed against the costs of investing in the research and development that makes its 
intellectual value contributions possible, whereas an intellectual value implementer would need to 
make a similar evaluation against potential product revenues. While the current existence of the 
thriving telecommunications market means, de facto, that such a tradeoff is possible, the process of 
agreeing on a mutually acceptable tradeoff between objectives would be time-consuming and costly. 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the implementation of a royalty cap could significantly delay the 
process of actually negotiating licenses based on the standards set. While the current system is not 
overly sensitive to delays in such negotiations, as they can now typically span several months, 
delaying them further could hamper the dissemination process necessary for standardization activities 
to have their intended effects. One means of preventing such delays from becoming unmanageable 
would therefore be to institute a separate body or institutions capable of neutrally monitoring the 
process of licensing to determine the valuation grounds applicable to projected product value, and the 
current state of licensing as related to the standard in question. Such an institution would monitor the 
overall cumulative royalty level, and be able to advice on the possibility for actors to remain within the 
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realm of the cap. Again, however, establishing such a body would require a heavy administrative 
investment, as well as a clear consensus, which is why such practices may not be possible to 
implement in existing standardization organizations. 
10.3 Patent Pools 
One of the main solutions presented by some actors within the telecommunication industry during the 
discussions made in the SSO‟s is patent pools. By introducing patent pools some actors hope to 
achieve low royalties for many essential patents. “A patent pool is an agreement between two or more 
patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or/and third parties”.67 Or as some 
might prefer: “A patent pool is the aggregator of intellectual property rights which are the subject of 
cross licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, 
such as joint venture, set up to administer the patent pool”.68  
 
Described in words a pool management or patent holding entity is formed outside the SSO‟s and 
functions independently from it. This patent holding entity will be the legal entity so to say that will 
examine all incoming patents that want to be part of a pool. When admitting a patent to this entity the 
procedure of the examination begins as to determine if the patent is essential to a technology or not. 
All essential patents will then be categorized and sorted dependent on the nature of the patent. All 
licensing term negotiations will take part through the patent holding entity that is the key to the patent 
pools and the royalties are proportional to the number of licenses necessary for a compliant 
implementation. The idea behind this is to sort all patents essential for a standard into one pool that 
will be granted one price for all the patents in the pool. This will have as an effect the reduction of 
costs from the licensee as there is only one negotiation having to be made with the patent holding 
entity and not with each licensor independently. At the first glance the patent pools will both save 
money and time for the licensees. However, there are some downsides to a model as such.  
10.3.1 Consequences of establishing patent pools 
Even if the people working within the patent holding entities are representatives from different 
companies influencing all decisions made about the patents essentiality, these decisions are subjected 
to subjective notions. SSO‟s today only look at defining the standards without acknowledging which 
patents exist and are included in the standards as such. The new patent pooling system that is proposed 
will in a way extend the authority of this new entity. Besides from the fact that the patent essentiality 
                                                     
67 Examensjobb patent pooler 
68 ibid 
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will take much time to define, there will always be the problem of people working with the 
determination will have a hard time of being unbiased or have a holistic picture of the amount of 
patents existing. There is however a positive aspect of having a committee doing such assessments and 
that is that the technologies becoming standards will be easier connected to the exact patents, and 
licensing will become easier since potential licensees will pay a standard fee for all the patents 
included in the patent pool and needed for the standard. This will save some time for the licensees and 
licensors that will not be subjected to timeless discussions about licensing and make it easier for the 
licensees to find the patents essential for a technology and thus not infringe unintentionally.  
 
Even if the members of this new entity are objective and able to distinguish which patents are included 
in the new standards and thus essential, the time aspect will increase dramatically. The process risks 
becoming too long for the essentiality valuation, since there will be patents submitted from all IP-
holders that would like to have their patents pronounced as essential to the standards. There are an 
unmanageable amount of patents in the world and the numbers are increasing by the day, the 
prediction is that the essentiality valuation of all incoming patents will take too much time 
endangering the new system. However this problem can be limited through implementing specific 
policies and roles for the submission of patents and evaluations. The patents pools should concern 
specific technology areas and have a limited number of members with a limited number of patents to 
make the assessment less time consuming. However, implementing such rules of restriction can be 
difficult since the number of standardization members is quiet large and everyone want to become a 
part of the standards with their technology. 
 
By implementing a patent pooling system the risk of the process being time consuming and not 
satisfactory for all involved is high. It is hard to find a committee that will be not biased and have the 
competence and staff to examine and determine which patents are essentials to which technologies. 
Nevertheless, even if this system were to work from an administrative way, there is still the difficulty 
of dividing the licensing fees among the different actors owning the patents. The idea with patent 
pooling is that the licensee will pay a fixed royalty fee for accessing all patents, but what will that fee 
be and how will it be distributed among actors? Some may say that these are just detail questions, but 
the problem still remains in companies having the intellectual rights for their technologies have to be 
able to compete not with only the actors within the standards but all actors inside, which will be harder 
through a system as such.   
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Patent pools can have as a direct result that actors choose to “operate” outside the patent pooling 
system because it is less time consuming and the possibility of earning more money because of the 
individual negotiations increases. There will always be actors outside the system (patent trolls, 
submarines) that will not be obliged to the patent pooling rules and licensing fees will be subjected to 
individual negotiations as now and without the FRAND policy there is a risk of royalties becoming too 
high for some patents. However, not all actors are part of the standardization organizations, but the 
positive effects of a standardization organization increase as the members increase and the standards 
become more widely accepted. Having a patent pool system that in a way decreases the competitive 
advantages can drive some actors away, wanting to compete in a more individual basis.  
 
Before determining if patent pooling is a good system or not, one has to take into consideration both 
pros and cons with this system. There are ways of limiting some of the problems with such a system if 
policies and rules are made in advance. Having for example a limited amount of actors and patents in 
each technology specific area can result in actors getting more license fees than before and in a less 
troublesome ways, since because of the user-friendliness approach of the patent pools for the licensees 
they are now able to easier determine how much and to whom they have to pay the fees without 
worrying about paying overprices. As for the licensor it becomes more easy to control the money 
inflow and are still able to have individual licensing agreements for the patents left outside the system 
and be lucrative in that way.  
10.4 New generation standardization bodies 
There are different kinds of standardization bodies and organizations. Some are larger than others, 
more exclusive when it comes to members and more specialized into technology areas. Consortia are a 
kind of standardization bodies that are governed by policies created by the members of the body. The 
members are exclusive and not everyone can become a member. In contradiction to those there are the 
standard organizations that are governed by governmental institutions and membership is open for 
everyone who wished to become a member. Consortia are a forum where different actors on the 
market and members can discuss and decide upon new standards. Most patent key actors are members 
of multiple consortia and standard organizations in order to influence decisions upon future standards 
in a better way. Consortia create their own standards and have different rules when it comes to 
licensing technology. While some standards organizations try to lobby for FRAND terms when 
licensing others have more open rules when it comes to that. Being a member of an influential 
consortium or standards organization can make or break a company with many patents.  
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Consortia are created to ensure better conditions for its members when introducing new standards. 
When big actors on the market decide upon a standard they will try to form it as to include their own 
patents to gain royalty. For the members inside the consortium the licensing terms are often more 
preferable and for those outside the body. The reason behind creating new consortia is to create 
forums for members with special interests and knowledge will be able to collaborate with better 
conditions. When changing the rules of a standardization body and incentive for starting new consortia 
were the rules do not apply becomes apparent. This can create an environment were few influential 
actors come together and form standardization bodies and implementing standards by excluding others. 
This could create a chaotic atmosphere and making the standardization process something controlled 
by few actors on the market striving for their own winnings. As mentioned earlier the standardization 
processes flourish as the members increase, since there is less division on the market as to which 
technologies to implement. The acknowledgment one gains on the market by owing essential patents 
to these standards is larger since more actors/members are aware of the owning structure and will 
honor it since they would otherwise risk having others infringing on their turfs.  
 
Starting a consortium is not problem-free. It costs a lot to establish a new consortium and there are a 
lot of details that have to be worked out in order to begin. Actors that are going to become members 
must have incentives to start in a forum like that and the rules created must be satisfactory and 
followed by everyone. Having a situation were members of standardizations organizations pushes for 
changes in the system can create a climate for actors wanting to create new forums in order not to be 
part of the changes. This may create conflicts when actors will try to create consortia to lobby for their 
own winning and exclude as many non essential actors as they can.  
 
Actors create consortia to reach different objectives that are technology specific, members specific or 
even geographical specific. In the event that IP implementers such as operators would see the need for 
altering current standardization systems for example there will be incentives for them to create an 
exclusive consortium where their interests are supported or at least discussed. Being the means to the 
end users in the telecomm industry, they have the structural power to drive for changes that will create 
advantages for them and their end users. Creating a forum were the operators can in unity strive for 
changes can mean some alterations in the existing system of standardization were operators will have 
more power in participating during standards creation. Operators could also create consortia with some 
of the actors with essential patents and create a monopolistic market where they will license 
technology only belonging to the members of the consortia. However, this in a way goes against the 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
93 
notion of standardization that has as an overall objective to pass standards that everyone will 
implement in order to create user utility.  
 
IP holders have also incentives for creating consortia with each other excluding operators that strive 
for changes. If they eliminate all voices for change they are able to control the standards and the fees 
connected to them in a better way. The risk in such a situation is that licensing fees can become higher 
and in some cases technologies outside the consortia may be preferred by the operators because of the 
lower cost. However, some actors have a lot of essential patents and are able to drive for new 
standards and implementation of those in a way that small individual actors never will be able to. 
Some actors have thus not complied with the rules of the standardization organizations that they are 
members in and disregard licensing rules and infringe on others patents. Examples of these include 
patent trolls and submarine licensors as previously discussed in this thesis. IP-holders as such can 
easily be excluded through the creation of new consortia were membership is limited and controlled. 
In this way members part of the consortium can be united under the same rules and objectives and 
becoming more competitive to other actors and their technologies. 
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11. Conclusions 
It is clear from the analysis presented in this thesis that a market characterized by standardized 
collaborative development innovation and coordinated technology diffusion differs greatly from what 
is perceived as typical free market conditions.  Such markets take on unique identifying characteristics 
based on the actors involved in creating the standardization structures, and are thus necessary to study 
as phenomena in their own right, rather than apply conventional models of economic theory. The 
European telecommunications market is a clear example of this, and the thesis demonstrated the 
unique qualities and structures that combined to form a standardization system in which actors 
interacted to create a market, and to maximize their compensation possibilities. 
 
Describing the standardization system required the utilization of models adapted to the situation, and 
thus the thesis attempted to present new ways of categorizing and understanding standardization 
activities that reflected the importance of intellectual value flow. By first categorizing intellectual 
value, and then mapping intellectual value creation activities into an intellectual value network and an 
intellectual value chain, the thesis presented a holistic means for understanding the standardization 
system, which emphasized comprehensiveness over practical detail. A key feature in this approach 
was the emphasis on intellectual property activities, which take on a far more significant role in a 
standardization market. 
 
Using the analytical framework presented, the thesis then analyzed actor behaviour within the 
standardization system to identify the potential conflicts and the possibilities for alterations in the 
system. A clear and recurring feature identified in the system was a lack of clarity when it comes to 
the rules and policies of the SSO‟s that in many ways provide the fundamental structures of the system. 
This lack of clarity has already prompted initiatives to change existing structures by some actors. The 
SSO‟s themselves are reflective of the unusual nature of the standardized telecommunications, and 
contain many complicated flows of influence  and actors that have multiple roles at different times 
where in a climate of competitiveness and collaboration actors are forced to discuss new technologies 
and decide upon future standards while carrying for their own interest. The explicit decision of SSO‟s 
to avoid taking a strong role in the administration of intellectual property matters, and policies such as 
FRAND which build on vague and unexamined compromises between actor interests were identified 
as contributing factors to the conflicts in the current system. 
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One of the main such conflicts, prompting the initiation of the thesis project as such, was the challenge 
by the Vodafone-led coalition of operators, attempting to bring about an overhaul of the licensing 
system in European standardization. Based on this initiative, four different scenarios were identified, 
presented and analyzed, with the objective of understanding how actor initiatives could alter the 
structures of the standardization system and impact the compensation possibilities for other actors in 
the system. These scenarios were presented in the form of tools enabling change, reflecting the fact 
that the uncertainty and flexibility in the system could allow the strategically aware actor to implement 
such changes proactively, controlling the changes rather than being threatened by the. In this way, 
each tool was seen as a means for the different actors to maximize the control in the exploitation of the 
system.  
 
The first tool analyzed was the adoption of royalty restrictions, either in the form of RF licensing or 
royalty caps. Clear and unambiguous royalty restrictions would create transparency and reliability in 
the system, and would allow IP implementers such as the Vodafone-led coalition to feel that undue 
licensing costs were not being imposed. It was found that both of these alternatives curtail the 
potential revenue stream from intellectual property within the system, as licensing revenues are limited 
in both scenarios, they differ drastically in many respects. RF licensing was shown to be fairly simple 
to implement and administrate, but very difficult to maintain without a cohesive sense of purpose and 
incentives outside of IPR licensing. Royalty caps, on the other hand, could easily become 
overburdened by administrative hurdles, and would be difficult to create necessary consensus around. 
 
The second tool analyzed in the thesis was the implementation of an ex ante declaration regime, 
meaning that licensing terms would be established and declared prior to the setting of any new 
standard. This was found to be an optimal tool for reducing perceived competition asymmetry, and for 
creating administrative oversight mechanisms predictable reliability in the system. However, it was 
also found that an ex ante declaration would require additional investments in administrative structures 
within the system, and while it would most likely create a more efficient and competitive IPR handling 
mechanism, the initial creation of such a structure would require both compromise and lengthy 
preparation. 
 
The third tool analyzed was the creation of a separate patent pool, independent of existing standards 
setting organizations. Even if such a process could be lengthy and difficult to implement until some 
routines and policies are worked through it can be a potentially good way for IP-holders to reach out to 
more licensees. By creating patent pools for specific technological features makes it easier for the 
© CIP - Center for Intellectual Property Studies 
 
 
96 
licensee to license the correct patents. For the IP-holder of the essential patent since there will be a 
limited amount of patents in the pool they will divide the winnings amongst the patent holders. Still 
the IP-holders are able to approach licensee with patents outside the pools that can be of equal interest 
to the licensee and those can be negotiated outside the patent pooling system. In a way the patent pools 
can be seen as the basic package one has to license for having the rights to a specific technological 
feature, but for the upgraded version the licensee will have to negotiate the licenses separately with the 
IP-holder as it is done today.  
 
The final alternative looked at was the creation of new standards setting organizations. Most of the 
current major SSO‟s have existed for a long time and during that time new consortia with different 
objectives have risen to fill the void left by the standards organizations. However not easy to create a 
consortium there are many that have tried and some are still alive and running. The rise of new 
standardization organizations should not be seen as a direct threat, but as something with potential. 
Even if operators come together and form a consortia of their own or together with some of the IP-
holders, there will still be the same opportunity for the remaining actors to do so as well. Having IP-
holders creating consortia to exclude other IP-holders can also be seen as an opportunity to create 
forums for discussion between those who are likeminded. By creating a consortium with actors that 
have the same objectives can create a climate of competitiveness on the market that will better fulfil 
the needs of the end-users and the IP-holders as well.  
 
Ultimately, no single tool was seen as a comprehensive solution for the sources of conflict identified 
in the system; instead, the importance of a strategically aware perspective and an understanding of the 
mechanisms for intellectual value creation and management were singled out as key factors in 
surviving such changes and, if necessary, promoting them. Each tool presented could equally well be 
seen as a threat, and the primary recommendation of the study, therefore, is to further develop 
solutions based on such perceived threats, to create a foundation for turning the risks into opportunities. 
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